An Analysis of the Mechanism of Civil Servant’s Illegal Administration: Based on the Methodology of State Space Model

Shumei WANG


The principal-agent relationships exist between the administrative institutions and the civil servants as well as the administrative leaders and the civil servants when the administrative power is exercised. Given the condition that the assigned civil servants are fully equipped with the corresponding professional qualification, this paper analyses the constraints from the clients and agents in those two relationships inside the administration institution, then drawing the conclusion that the illegal administration of civil servants is largely influenced by their leaders’ judgment of the essence of the legislation. We, therefore, should increase the civil servants’ salary, improve the assessment and promotion system, strengthen the legal awareness and ability of administrative leaders and intensify the external administrative supervision and the right restriction.
The illegal administration of civil servants refers to the violation of law and damage to the interests of the law-protected social relations when they are in the exercise of their power and in the performance of their duty. This would disrupt normal social order, pose a threat to the authority of the law, damage the public interests and government’s image as well as set a bad example for our people. Prevention on the occurrence of illegal administration is the continuing concern of the academic circle and related departments. The existing research is of great significance to the prevention of the violation of illegal administration since it mainly focuses on the formation, classification of responsibility and the construction of legal liability system of illegal administration. However, these studies seldom explore the mechanism of civil servants’ illegal administration from theoretical analysis, thus the countermeasure is weak. This paper attempts to apply the methodology of state space model into analyzing the mechanism of civil servants’ illegal administration in the exercise of administrative power so as to improve the responsible institution and reduce the occurrence of illegal administration.


Illegal administration; Principal-agent relationship; State space model; Incentive institution; Mechanism; External supervision

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