Duopoly Output Game with Bounded Rationality and Limiter Control
Abstract
Based on the bounded rationality strategy, a duopoly output game model is constructed in this paper. The local stability conditions of Nash equilibrium point of the model are also analyzed by employing the well-known Jury’s criteria. The results show that the model has three boundary fixed points and a local stable Nash equilibrium point. When the combination values of the two firms’ adjustment speed are out of the local stability region, some more complex dynamic phenomena will be caused such as bifurcation and chaos. In order to eliminate chaos and improve the profit level, a limiter control scheme is designed. Numerical simulations further verify that the designed limiter control scheme is feasible and effective to eliminate chaos and improve profit level.
Key words: Duopoly game; Bounded rationality; Limiter control; Chaos
Keywords
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3968/j.mse.1913035X20110504.167
Refbacks
- There are currently no refbacks.
Copyright (c)
Reminder
We are currently accepting submissions via email only.
The registration and online submission functions have been disabled.
Please send your manuscripts to mse@cscanada.net,or mse@cscanada.org for consideration.
We look forward to receiving your work.
We only use three mailboxes as follows to deal with issues about paper acceptance, payment and submission of electronic versions of our journals to databases:
caooc@hotmail.com; mse@cscanada.net; mse@cscanada.org
Articles published in Management Science and Engineering are licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC-BY).
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING Editorial Office
Address:1055 Rue Lucien-L'Allier, Unit #772, Montreal, QC H3G 3C4, Canada.
Telephone: 1-514-558 6138
Http://www.cscanada.net Http://www.cscanada.org
Copyright © 2010 Canadian Research & Development Centre of Sciences and Cultures