Research on Game of Manufacturer and Retailer Under Government’s Subsidy

Jian LIU, Guobin QIU

Abstract


Considering demand influenced by government’s subsidy, retail price, random factor, objective functions of maximizing expected profit are suggested to supplier and retailer, equilibrium solutions of supplier’s wholesale price, retailer’s retail price and order quantity are available based on Stackelberg game model, following conclusions are drawn by theoretical and numerical analysis, wholesale price, retail price, average demand, order quantity, profit increase with government’s subsidy; consumer’s expense price decreases with government’s subsidy. which means subsidy can boost demand, increase enterprise’s profit, reduce consumer’s cost, therefore, subsidy policy is favorable to government, enterprises and consumer.
Key words: Government’s subsidy; Manufacturer; Retailer; Stackelberg game

Keywords


Government’s subsidy; Manufacturer; Retailer; Stackelberg game



DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3968/j.mse.1913035X20110503.4z846

Refbacks

  • There are currently no refbacks.


Copyright (c)




Share us to:   


Reminder

  • We are currently accepting submissions via email only.

    The registration and online submission functions have been disabled.

    Please send your manuscripts to mse@cscanada.net,or mse@cscanada.org  for consideration.

    We look forward to receiving your work.

 


We only use three mailboxes as follows to deal with issues about paper acceptance, payment and submission of electronic versions of our journals to databases:
caooc@hotmail.com; mse@cscanada.net; mse@cscanada.org

 Articles published in Management Science and Engineering are licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC-BY).

 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING Editorial Office

Address:1055 Rue Lucien-L'Allier, Unit #772, Montreal, QC H3G 3C4, Canada.

Telephone: 1-514-558 6138
Http://www.cscanada.net Http://www.cscanada.org

Copyright © 2010 Canadian Research & Development Centre of Sciences and Cultures