Game Analysis of Promoting Substitute Public Goods Provision

Yan WANG

Abstract


A game with parameter for substitute public goods provision is constructed by using non-cooperative game methods. During the voluntary provision of public good, the influence to individual action of the government behavior and strategic selection of contributors are analysed. Further, incentive mechanism for public goods provision is discussed. For this problem, a cooperative game for public goods provision is constructed, in which the core of game are coincident with Lindahl allocation. So this allocation meets individual rationality and collective rationality.

Key Words: Substitute Public Goods; incentive mechanism; core; Lindahl allocation

 


Keywords


Substitute Public Goods; incentive mechanism; core; Lindahl allocation

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3968/j.mse.1913035X20090304.008

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