Research on Cooperative Advertising Decisions in Dual-Channel Supply Chain Under Asymmetric Demand Information When Online Channel Implements Discount Promotion

Kai JI

Abstract


This paper analyzes the both online-channel price discount and advertising decisions in a dual-channel supply chain involved one manufacturer and one retailer. A Stackelberg game dominated by the manufacturer is established. The influence of asymmetric demand information is analyzed. The study shows that retailer has a motivation to lie about the offline demand information and it always announces a higher advertising impact factor. To induce the retailer to reveal to true demand information, a franchise-fee contract is designed.


Keywords


Cooperative advertising; Price discount; Dual channel; Demand information asymmetry

Full Text:

PDF

References


Babich, V., Li, H., Ritchken, P., & Wang, Y. (2012). Contracting with asymmetric demand information in supply chains. European Journal of Operational Research, 217(2), 333-341.

Berger, P. D., Lee, J., & Weinberg, B. D. (2006). Optimal cooperative advertising integration strategy for organizations adding a direct online channel. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 57(8), 920-927.

Burnetas, A., Gilbert, S. M., & Smith, C. E. (2007). Quantity discounts in single-period supply contracts with asymmetric demand information. IIE Transactions, 39(5), 465-479.

Chen, G. P., C., Zhang, X. M., & Xiao, J. (2016). Coordination model for cooperative advertising in dual-channel supply chain when online channel implements discount promotion. Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 30(4).

Gan, X., Sethi, S. P., & Zhou, J. (2010). Commitment-penalty contracts in drop-shipping supply chains with asymmetric demand information. European Journal of Operational Research, 204(3), 449-462.

Heese, H. S., & Kemahlioglu-Ziya, E. (2014). Enabling opportunism: Revenue sharing when sales revenues are unobservable. Production and Operations Management, 23(9), 1634-1645.

Huang, S., Yang, C., & Zhang, X. (2011). Pricing and cooperative advertising decision models in dual-channel supply chain. Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems, 17(12).

Li, B., Hou, P. W., & Li, Q. H. (2015). Cooperative advertising in a dual-channel supply chain with a fairness concern of the manufacturer. IMA Journal of Management Mathematics. doi: 10.1093/imaman/dpv025

Özalp, Ö., & Wei, W. (2006). Strategic commitments for an optimal capacity decision under asymmetric forecast information. Management Science, 52(8), 1238-1257.

Wang, H., & Zhou, J. (2009). Study on decisions of dual channel supply chain with different pricing schemes. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 17(6), 84-90.

Yan, R. (2006). Cooperative advertising in a dual channel supply chain. International Journal of Electronic Marketing & Retailing, 1(2), 99-114.

Yang, L., Ji, J. N., & & Zhang, Z. Y. (2015). Research on cooperative advertising decisions in a dual-channel supply chain under asymmetric demand information. Control and Decision, 30(12), 2285-2292.

Zhang, Z. Y., Hua-Juan, L. I., Lei, Y., & Shi, Y. Q. (2014). Dual-channel coordination strategies on advertising cooperation based on differential game. Kongzhi Yu Juece/control & Decision, 29(5), 873-879.




DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3968/n

Refbacks

  • There are currently no refbacks.


Copyright (c) 2017 Kai ji

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Share us to:   

Reminder

  • We are currently accepting submissions via email only.

    The registration and online submission functions have been disabled.

    Please send your manuscripts to mse@cscanada.net，or mse@cscanada.org  for consideration.

    We look forward to receiving your work.

 


We only use three mailboxes as follows to deal with issues about paper acceptance, payment and submission of electronic versions of our journals to databases:
caooc@hotmail.com; mse@cscanada.net; mse@cscanada.org

 Articles published in Management Science and Engineering are licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC-BY).

 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING Editorial Office

Address:1055 Rue Lucien-L'Allier, Unit #772, Montreal, QC H3G 3C4, Canada.

Telephone: 1-514-558 6138
Http://www.cscanada.net Http://www.cscanada.org

Copyright © 2010 Canadian Research & Development Centre of Sciences and Cultures