Profit Allocation of E-Commerce Logistics Enterprise Alliance Based on Revised Shapely: Under the Circumstance of Warehouse Overload
Abstract
This paper introduces the impact factor set, which includes input cost value, risk share coefficient, leadership in industry, market influence and the desire of participation, to revise the classic Shapley value, and use the revised Shapely value to research the profit allocation problem of an E-commerce logistics enterprise alliance under the circumstance of warehouse overload. A numerical example is presented to demonstrate the feasibility of the revised Shapely value. The result indicates that the revised Shapely value can objectively reflect the regulating effect of impact factors, show the differences between the core enterprise and general enterprises in an alliance, and promote the rationality and equity of alliance profit allocation.
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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3968/n
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