

Liberal Ideology and Its Claim of Final Form of Human Government: Explaining the Challenges Facing the Liberal Ideology

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Abstract

This article interrogates liberal ideology and its claim of final form of human government. The political corollary of liberal ideology is hinged on the premise of democratic ethos and notably multiparty, constitutionalism, transparency and accountability, free, fair and periodic elections and above all upholding the rule of law. Using the qualitative method approach, liberal ideology can satisfy humanity's deepest desires and has no fundamental contradictions. Its triumph has signaled the end of the protracted historical conflict that had previously prevented its growth. Because it fit the current way of thinking, liberalism received extensive prominence in the western press and academic community. Liberal ideas have been internally split and sidetracked by both important and trivial concerns for the past few years. This study explained that while liberalism and democracy usually go together, they can be separated in theory. A country can be liberal without being democratic. Britain experienced it in the eighteenth – century. A country can also be democratic without being liberal, that is without protecting the rights of individual citizens and minority citizens of the country. The study notes that the economic strand of liberalism focuses on trade. The argument of the liberal is that, trade is important, not because it prevents states from going to war, but because it may lead states to define their interests in a way that makes war less important to them. This paper, however, argues that despite the challenges of liberal ideology, Liberalism recognizes the right of

free economic activity and economic exchange based on private property and markets. Since the term capitalism has acquired so many pejorative connotations over the years, it has recently become a fashion to speak of “free market economies” instead; both are acceptable alternative terms for economic liberalism.

Key words: Liberal ideology; Liberalism; Capitalism; Liberal democracy; Liberal economy

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INTRODUCTION

Capitalism as a political cum arrangement in which means of production, distribution and exchange are privately owned and controls led by individual and corporate organizations is anchored not only on the praxis of laissez-faireism and non – governmental intervention, but rather forces demand and supply allocate resources and value. Whereas its political corollary liberal democracy is hinged on the premise of democratic ethos and notably multiparty, constitutionalism, transparency and accountability, popular sovereignty, periodic free and fair elections and above all, upholding the rule of law (Goel, 2003).

Francis Fukuyama (1992: ix) famously puts it that,

In the battle of ideas, liberalism had triumph. At the end of history, there are no serious ideological competitors left to liberal democracy.

As succinctly put by Nye (2011), the end of the Cold War suggested that liberal capitalism had prevailed. In one sense, Fukuyama is right. There is no longer one

single competitor to liberal capitalism as an overarching ideology. And the relations among the rich democracies have been profoundly transformed. Neither Germany and France nor the United States and Japan expect or plan for war with each other. There complex interdependence forms large island of democratic peace in the world today, along the lines of Kant's liberal predictions.

If the above statement is true why is it that, some countries of the world still believe and practice other ideologies? If there are no War in the United States and some other countries of the west as a result of the practice of liberal capitalism as claimed by the Western Scholars, why is it that same ideology (liberal capitalism) has not stop the Wars going on in the Third World Countries and Middle East nations?

In 1993, Samuel P. Huntington published an article (later a book) "The Clash of Civilizations" that became a well-known counter to Fukuyama's vision. Huntington argued that rather than the fundamental sources of conflict in the new World being primarily ideological or economic, the great divisions that would dominate conflict would be cultural (Huntington, 2011). Now going by the argument, is it true that the Western Scholars are contradicting themselves concerning the best ideology? Also going by the above argument, have we in fact reached the end of history? Are there, in other words, any fundamentals contradictions in human life that cannot be resolved in the content of modern liberalism that would be resolvable by an alternative political economic structure?

If we accept the idealist premises laid out above, we must seek answer to this question in the realm of ideology and consciousness. Our task is to answer exhaustively the challenges to liberalism promoted by every crackpot messiah around the world, but only those that are embodied in important social or political forces and movements, and which are therefore part of the world history.

On the other hand are there, in other words, any fundamental "contradictions" in human life that cannot be resolved in the context of modern liberalism, that would be resolved by an alternative political-economic structure? Again what is the implication of the end of history to international relations? Now in spite of the claim by Fukuyama that the emergence of global capitalism and liberal democracy is an end state of human ideological evolution, why is it that global capitalism always experience economic recession (economic doom)? This paper delve into the above problems and seek answers to them.

The methodology used in this study is qualitative and is consistent with interpretivist paradigm or worldview. According to Tuli (2010), the interpretivist paradigm holds that people's social interactions form meaning systems that evolve over time, which in turn create patterns in the world. The liberal ideology and its claim of final form of human government was examined in this

study using content analysis. In publications about the liberal ideology, content analysis is a rapidly expanding technique (Macnamara, 2005; Neuendorf, 2002; Riffe & Freitag, 1997). Additionally, the researchers consulted literature on research methodology, liberal theory and Fukuyama end of history, liberal democracy and its predictions, and other topics. We chose articles about the liberal ideology and its claim of final form of human government from the approximately 1,340,000 results that the Google search produced. According to Lievonon (2013), Google displays the most pertinent articles at the top of a search. Accordingly, links to the most pertinent articles are found on the first page that appears when searching (Tarisayi & Manik, 2020). In order to find the most pertinent articles, the researchers employed purposive selection, which was informed by the Google algorithm. The documented data from academic and grey literature complemented field data. The analysis was thematic. This study comprises seven sections. The section after the introduction discusses on the main postulates of neo-liberal theory and Fukayama's end of history. The third section explains liberal democracy and its predictions. While the fourth section deals with the demise of Union of Soviet Socialist Republic and the emergence of United States as the unipolar power. The fifth section deals with western liberal democracy (global capitalism) as the final form of human government as claimed by Fukuyama. The sixth section narrates how humankind was on the cusp of brand – new ideology in 1989. The last section is the conclusion.

THE MAIN POSTULATES OF NEO – LIBERAL THEORY AND FUKUYAMA'S END OF HISTORY

The neo-liberal thinking of international relations is the inspired conventional thinking which is an off- shot of modernization theory, albeit slightly differentiated in approach the forms and content of these two theoretical construct shared the intent, this neo-liberal school of thought is represented by the work of scholars such as Henry Kissenger, Samuel P. Huntington and Francis Fukuyama among others. With regard to the popular concept of globalization is that global capitalism and liberal democracy is the only sure way of attaining human aspiration to development and prosperity.

Nowhere does this neo-liberal theory of international relations find better expression than in the book end of history and the last man by Francis Fukuyama and propelled to dominance by the failure of the Soviet Union, and the consequent unrestrained credibility facilities given to the output of the IMF, WTO, the World Bank, International corporation and the United States International Economic Policies.

Fukuyama in his opening paragraph of his article of 1989 observed that;

In watching the flow of events over the past decade or so, it is hard to avoid the feeling that something very fundamental has happened in the world history. The past years has seen a flood of articles commemorating the end of Cold War, and the fact that peace seems to be breaking out in many regions of the world. Most of these analyses lack any conceptual framework for distinguishing between what is essential and what is contingent or accidental in history, and predictably superficial (Fukuyama, 1989, p.1).

What the above imply is that every other writings about the end of Cold War and the predictions thereafter is wrong and does not hold waters. Thus, from Fukuyama's view his own predictions are superior to every other prediction about the end of Cold War.

The Twentieth century saw the developed world descend into an access of ideological violence, as liberalism contended first with the remnants of absolutism, the bolshevism and fascism, and finally an updated Marxism that threatened to lead to the ultimate apocalypse of nuclear war. But the century that began full of self – confidence in the ultimate triumph of Western liberal democracy seems at its close to be returning full circle to where it started: no to an end of ideology or a convergence between capitalism and socialism, as earlier predicted, but to an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism (Fukuyama, 1989).

The triumph of western idea (liberalism) is evident because all ideas or viable systematic alternatives to western liberalism have failed as at 1992. To Fukuyama (1989), there have been unmistakably changes in the intellectual climate of the world's two largest communist countries in the past decade, and beginnings of a significance reform movements in both countries. But this phenomenon extends beyond high politics and it can be seen also in ineluctable spread of consumerist Western culture in such diverse contexts as the peasants market and colour television sets now omnipresent through China, the cooperative restaurants and clothing stores opened in the past year in Moscow, the Beethoven piped into Japanese department stores, and the rock music enjoyed alike in Prague, Rangoon, and Tehran etc.

What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post – war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.

However, some scholars disagree with Fukuyama's arguments and predictions, in which he argued that remarkable consensus concerning the legitimacy of liberal democracy as a system of government had emerged throughout the world over the past few years, as it conquered rival ideologies like heredity, fascism, and most recently Communism. Prominent among these scholars

is Robert Kagan, Richard Titmuss, C. Wright Mills, C.B Macpherson and Alasdair MacIntyre. Kagan argued that instead of the end of history what we are experiencing now is the return of history.

Kagan in his book, the return of history and the end of dreams, he stressed that;

Over the course of the 1990s, that competition re – emerged as, one by one, rising powers entered or reentered the field. First China, then India, set off on unprecedented burst of economic growth, accompanied by incremental but substantial increases in military and economic capacity (Kagan, 2009 p.11).

Thus, by the beginning of twenty – first century, Japan had begun a slow economic recovery and was moving toward a more active international role both diplomatically and militarily. Then came Russia, rebounding from economic calamity to steady growth built on export of its huge reserves of oil and natural gas.

Titmuss on his part observed that the champions of the end of history overlook the problems of monopolistic concentration of economic power, social disorganization and cultural deprivation within the capitalist system. C. Wright Mills has dubbed the upholders of end of ideology thesis the advocate of *status quo*. In Mills view, it an ideology of political complacency which appears to be the only now available for many social scientists to acquiesce in or to justify the established social structure. So far as human and political ideas are concerned, the end of ideology thesis stands for a denial of their relevance. C.B Macpherson posits that the champions of the end of ideology thesis make a futile attempt to solve the problem of equitable distribution within the market society. Alasdair MacIntyre has significantly observed that the 'end of ideology' theorists "failed to entertain one crucial alternative possibility: namely, that the end of ideology, far from marking the end of ideology, was itself a key expression of the ideology of the time and place where it arose" (Gaub, 2003, p. 23).

In short, Fukuyama's end of ideology is designed to promote the supremacy of liberal democratic system in theory as well as practice. In the contemporary climate of increasing urge for liberalization, privatization and globalization, this area seems to be riding high. However, it needs a close scrutiny. Collapse of Socialism in a large part of the world could be the result of human faults in its implementation. Moreover, Western democratic world is by no means an epitome of justice and morality. Human emancipation is a complex venture. There are no readymade answers to human problems.

A new configuration of power is fast emerging in the international stage today. It is a world of "one super power, many great powers," as the Chinese strategies put it. History has now returned with a vengeance nationalism and nation itself, far from being weakened from globalization. Ethnic nationalisms continue to bubble up in the Balkans and in the former republics of the Soviet

Union. But more significant is the return of great power nationalism. The clash of interests has overshadowed the new world order and ambitions of the great powers are again producing the alliances and counter alliances, and the elaborate dances and shifting partnerships, that a nineteenth – century diplomat would recognize instantly. They are also producing geopolitical fault lines where the ambitions of great powers overlap and conflict and where the seismic events of the future are most likely to erupt (Kagan, 2009 p. 12). This is contrary to Fukuyama's prediction of a unipolar ideology ruling the world.

LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND ITS PREDICTIONS.

There are three strands of this liberal thinking: economic, social and political. The political strand has two parts, one relating to institutions and the other to democracy. The economic strand focuses heavily on trade (Nye, 2009 p. 46).

Liberalism and democracy, though closely related, are separate concepts. Political liberalism can be defined simply as a rule of law that recognizes certain individual rights or freedoms from government control. Democracy, on the other hand, is the universal rights held by all citizens to have a share of political power, that is, the rights of all citizens to vote and participate in political activities. The right to participate in politics can be thought of as yet another liberal right – indeed, the most important one – and it is for this reason that liberalism has closely associated historically with democracy (Fukuyama, 1992 p. 42).

Thus, a country is democratic if it grants its citizens the right to choose their own government through periodic, free and fair, secret-ballot, multi-party elections, on the basis of universal and equal adult suffrage.

Fukuyama (1992) observed that although, democracy alone does not always accurately reflect the will or true self-interests of the people. But once we move away from a formal definition, we open up the possibility of infinite abuse of the democratic principle. In this century, the greatest enemies of democracy have attacked formal democracy in the name of substantive democracy. This was the justification used by V.I Lenin and the Bolsheviks party to close down the Russia Constituent Assembly and proclaim a party dictatorship, which was to achieve substantive democracy in the name of the people. Formal democracy, on the other hand, provides real institutional safeguards against dictatorship, and is much more likely to produce substantive democracy in the end.

While liberalism and democracy usually go together, they can be separated in theory. A country can be liberal without being democratic. Britain experienced it in the eighteenth – century. A country can also be democratic

without being liberal, that is without protecting the rights of individual citizens and minority citizens of the country. Islamic republic of Iran is a good example, which has held regular elections that were reasonably fair by third world standards, making the country more democratic than it was in the time of the Shah. But Iran is far from being liberal State; there are no guarantees of free speech, assembly, and above all, of religion. The most elementary rights of Iranian citizens are not protected by the rule of law, this have made the situation of ethnic and religious minorities in Iran worse off.

The economic strand focuses on trade. The argument of the liberal is that, trade is important, not because it prevents states from going to war, but because it may lead states to define their interests in a way that makes war less important to them. Economy of a country is transform through trade rather than through military conquest (Nye, 2009). Richard Rosecrance points to the example of Japan. In the 1930s, Japan thought the only way to gain access to markets was to create a greater East Asia Co-prosperity sphere, which required conquering its neighbours and requiring them to trade. In contrast to the 1930s, Japan today has successfully transformed its position in the world through trade, becoming the second largest national economy in the world (measured by official exchange rates).

Liberalism recognizes the right of free economic activity and economic exchange based on private property and markets. Since the term capitalism has acquired so many pejorative connotations over the years, it has recently become a fashion to speak of “free market economies” instead; both are acceptable alternative terms for economic liberalism. Liberalism as an ideology has different interpretation ranging from one country to the other, from the United States of Ronald Reagan and the British Margaret Thatcher to the social democracies of Scandinavia and the relatively statist regimes in Mexico and India (Fukuyama, 1992).

What is emerging victorious, in other words, is not so much liberal practice, as the liberal idea. As Fukuyama observed;

For a very large part of the world, there is now no ideology with pretensions to universality that is in a position to challenge liberal democracy, and no universal principle of legitimacy other than the sovereignty of the people (Fukuyama, 1992, p.1).

In Fukuyama view, Monarchism in its various forms had been largely defeated by the beginning of this century. Fascism and Communism, liberal democracy's main competitors and challenger up till now have both discredited themselves. If the Soviet Union (or its successor, Russia) fails to democratize, if Peru or the Philippines relapse into some form of authoritarianism, democracy will most likely have yielded to a colonel or bureaucrat who claims to speak in the name of Russian, Peruvian, or Philippine people alone. Even non-

democrats will have to speak the language of democracy in order to justify their deviation from the single universal standard.

Balancing the argument on liberal democracy, Kagan (2009) observed that;

The world's democracies need to begin thinking about how they can protect their interests and defend their principles in a world in which these are once again powerfully challenged. In a world increasingly divided along democratic and autocratic lines, the world democrats will have to stick together (Kagan, 2009, p. 97).

Kagan contrary to Fukuyama's position said, democracies need not stop trading with autocracies or engaging in negotiations with them over matters of both common interests and divergent interest.

It is easy to look at China and Russia, also Islamic republic of Iran today and believe the impervious influence. But one should not over – look their fragility and vulnerability. These autocratic regimes may be stronger than they were in the past in terms of wealth and global influence, but they still live in a predominantly democratic era (Kagan, 2009).

These autocracies struggle to create a new kind of legitimacy. Most of these countries reject external influence to their economies. For instance, China rejects any external influence on their economy. They resist support for any foreign internal political opposition; they are trying all they could to avoid what happen to the defunct Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR).

THE DEMISE OF UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC AND THE EMERGENCE OF UNITED STATES AS THE UNIPOLAR POWER

The Soviets were often accused of being expansionist, of being a revolutionary power rather than a status quo power. The Soviet Union also tended to want tangible or possession goal such as territory, (Nye, 2011), whereas the United States claimed to have wanted intangible goals – ways of establishing the general setting of international politics. The question now is what led to the demise of the Soviet Union? And Why 1989? Nye (2009) presents three reasons for the demise of the Soviet Union: Precipitating, Intermediate and Deep causes.

An individual, Mikhail Gorbachev was the precipitating causes of the end of Cold War and the demise of Soviet Union, Gorbachev wanted to reform Communism, not replace it. However, the reform snowballed into liberal democracy. On assumption of office in 1985, Gorbachev tried to discipline the Soviet people as a way to overcome the existing economic stagnation. When discipline was not enough to solve the problem,

he launched the idea of *perestroika* (restructuring), but he was unable to restructure from the top because the Soviet bureaucrats kept thwarting his orders. To light a fire under the bureaucrats, he used a strategy of *glasnost* (open discussion and democratization). Gorbachev believe was that when the people air their discontent with the way the system was working it would put pressure on the bureaucrats and help *perestroika* work. But once *glasnost* and democratization let people say what they are thinking, and vote on it, many people said, “We want out. There is no new form of Soviet citizen. This is an imperial dynasty, and we do not belong in this empire”. Gorbachev unleashed the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which became increasingly evident after the failed coup by the hard-liners in August 1991. By December 1991 the Soviet Union ceased to exist.

Thus, if not for the *perestroika* and *glasnost* policy of Gorbachev, the Soviets would have continued with the Cold War. George Kennan and Kennedy are both on target, for the intermediate causes. Two important intermediate causes were the soft power of liberal ideas, and imperial overstretch. The idea of openness and democracy and new thinking that Gorbachev used were western ideas that had been adopted by the generation of 1956. Aleksandra Yakovlev, one of the architects of *perestroika* and *glasnost*, had been an exchange student in the United States and was attracted to America theories of pluralism. The growth of the transnational communications and contacts pierced the iron curtain and helped spread Western popular culture and liberal ideas among the citizens of Soviet Union (Keohane & Nye, 2011).

The deep causes could be view from the perspective of Soviet economy. There was serious decline on the Soviet economy. Soviet central planning system could not respond to change in the world economy. Joseph Stalin had created a system of centralized economic direction that emphasized heavy metal smokestack industries. It was very inflexible – all thumbs and no fingers and tended to stockpile labour rather than transfer it to growing service industries. As the economist Joseph Schumpeter pointed out, Capitalism is creative destruction, a way of responding flexibility to major waves of technological change. At the end of the twentieth century, the major technological change of the third industrial revolution was the growing role of information as the scarcest resources in an economy. The Soviet system was particularly inept at handling information. Soviet goods and services could not keep to world standards. There was a great deal of turmoil in the world economy at the end of the twentieth century, but the western economies using market systems were able to transfer labour to services, to reorganize the heavy industries, and switch to computers. The Soviet could not keep up to the changes and these led to its collapse in 1989.

For the United States, the fall of the Soviet Union seemed a heaven-sent chance to fulfill a long held dream of global leadership – a leadership welcomed and even embraced by the world. American had always considered themselves the world's most important nation and its destined leader (Kagan, 2009). Benjamin Franklin said at the time of the revolution that;

The cause of America is the cause of all mankind. The United States was the locomotive at the head of mankind, with the rest of the world merely the caboose. (Clinton 1997, p.372).

In the new world order, as Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott put it;

The United States would define its strength indeed, It's very greatness, not in terms of its ability to achieve or maintain dominance over others, but in terms of ability to work with others in the interest of the international community as a whole (quoted in Kagan, 2009, p.9).

While Americas saw their self-image reaffirmed by the new world order, European believed that the new international order would be modeled after the European Union. As Scholar – Diplomat Robert Cooper put it, Europe was leading the world into a postmodern age, in which traditional national interests and power politics would give way to international law, supranational institutions, and loose sovereignty.

Even as these hopeful expectations arose, however, there were clouds on the horizon, signs of global divergence, stubborn traditions of culture, civilization, religion, and nationalism that resisted or cut against the common embrace of democratic liberalism and market capitalism. (Kagan, 2009). The main assumptions (predictions) of the Post-Cold War year collapsed almost as soon as they were formulated.

WESTERN LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (GLOBAL CAPITALISM) AS THE FINAL FORM OF HUMAN GOVERNMENT AS CLAIMED BY FUKUYAMA

The findings gathered have not agreed that western liberal democracy (global capitalism) is the final form of human government. However, there are other ideologies that pose challenge to western liberal democracy and global capitalism. Rather than the “end of history”, which Fukuyama boastfully predicted, the Post – Cold War world could be described as the return of history.

According to Fukuyama (1992) the emergence of globalization (New World Order) that saw the triumphalism of capitalism and internationalization of liberal democracy had signified the end of history and the last man.

What the above imply is that western liberal capitalist concept as represented by the United States of America

has won and proved itself to be right; it is now the inevitable and decisive direction to all future socio-economic development. It is in these senses that “history is purported to have ended” meaning that all theories that question liberal western capitalist formula for global economic development have been proved by history to be wrong.

Kagan (2009, p.98) postulate that in a world increasingly divided along democratic and autocratic lines, the world's democrats will have to stick together. This does not require a blind crusade on behalf of democracy everywhere at all times, or a violent confrontation with the autocratic powers. The world looks different primarily because the Soviet Union was different. No one would have suggested that western liberal democracy is the final form of human government if the communist Soviet Union had not so suddenly and dramatically died and been transformed after 1989.

In spite of the fall of the Soviet Union Communism, there are other challenging ideologies to western liberal democracy (global capitalism) today. First of this ideologies is the struggle of the radical Islamists against the powerful forces of modernization, capitalism, and globalization that they associate with the Judeo – Christian West, is one of the great challenge to western liberal democracy today.

The second ideology is autocracy. This ideology is mostly found in the Middle East countries that prefer autocracy to western liberal democracy. However, the question arises that, should the United States and others promote democracy in the Middle East too? One way to answer the question is to turn it around: Should the United States support autocracy in the Middle East? That is the only other choice, after all. There is no neutral stance on such matters. Today, the reemergence of great autocratic powers, along with the reactionary forces of Islam radicalism, has weakened the democratic (western democracy) order and threatens to weaken it further in the years and decades to come.

The return of history means more normal circumstances in which a single ideological cleavage does not drive the larger conflicts in international politics. Liberal democracy (global capitalism) has many competitors, albeit fragmented ones. Nye (2011, p. 261) argued that China and Russia use capitalism and global markets, yet neither are liberal nor fully capitalist. In other areas, religious fundamentalism challenges the norms and practices of liberal capitalism. We sometimes lump all religious fundamentalists together, but there are many fundamentalisms. What many have in common is a reaction against and a resistance to secular liberal capitalism. Thus, in my findings, the major response and challenges to western democracy (global capitalism) after the Cold War is ethnic, religious fundamentalism and national communalism.

The findings also reveals that with the attack on the world trade Centre and the pentagon, the two great institutions that represent and symbolize both liberal capitalism and democracy is a modern empirical evidence to show that history has not ended but is rather being attacked because it is unjust and exploitative.

HUMANKIND ON THE CUSP OF BRAND – NEW ORDER IN 1989

The findings revealed that humankind was on the cusp of brand – new order because after 1989 the world looks different. And the world looked different because the Soviet Union was different. No one would have suggested that history has ended if the communist Soviet Union had not so suddenly and dramatically died and been transformed after 1989.

Gorbachev's foreign policy, which he called "new thinking", also contributed to the sudden change to a brand – new order. Nye (2011) emphasizes that the policy had two very important elements. One was changing ideas that constructivists emphasize, such as the concept of common security in which the classical security dilemma is escaped by joining together to provide security. Gorbachev and the people around him said that in a world of increasing interdependence, security was a non-zero-sum game, and all could benefit through cooperation. The existence of the nuclear threat meant all could perish together if the competition got out of hand. The other dimension of Gorbachev's foreign policy change was his view that expansionism is usually more costly than beneficial.

The findings on the above reveal that, rather than try to build as many weapons as possible; Gorbachev proclaimed a doctrine of "sufficiency", holding a minimal number for protection. On the other foreign policy change, Gorbachev argued that the Soviet control over an empire in Eastern Europe was costing too much and providing too little benefit, and the invasion of Afghanistan had been a costly disaster. In his view it is no longer necessary to impose a communist social system as a way to ensure security on Soviets borders.

Thus by the summer of 1989, the Eastern Europeans were given more degrees of freedom. Hungary allowed East German to escape through its territory into Austria. This exodus of East German put enormous pressure on East German government. Additionally Eastern European governments no longer had the nerve (or Soviet backing) to put down demonstrations (Nye, 2009 p. 142). In November, the Berlin wall was pierced – a dramatic conclusion to a crescendo of events occurring over a very short period. However, these events stemmed from Gorbachev's miscalculations. The findings revealed that Gorbachev thought communism could be repaired, but in fact, in trying to repair it, he punched a hole in it. And like

a hole in a dam, the pent-up pressures began to escape, rapidly increasing the opening and causing the entire system to collapse.

The question still remains, why 1989? To some extent, Gorbachev was an accident of history. In the early 1980s, three old Soviet leaders died, one soon after the other. It was not until 1985 that the younger generation, the people who had come up under Khrushchev, the so – called generation of 1956. But if the members of the Communist Party Politburo had chosen one of Gorbachev's hardline competitors in 1985, it is quite plausible that the declining Soviet Union could have held on for another decade. It could not have collapse so quickly. Gorbachev's policies contributed greatly on the cusp of a brand – new order.

CONCLUSION

The paper concludes that there are ideologies that has fault the claim of the liberal ideology. Thus, it is a testament to the vitality of this enlightenment vision that hopes for a brand – new era in human history again took hold with such force after the fall of Soviet Communism. But this was all fallacy. The most destructive century in all the millennia of human history was not buried back in some deep, dark, ancient past. Our modern, supposedly enlightenment and western democracy (global capitalism) era produced the greatest of horrors – the massive aggression, the "total wars", ethnic cleansing, the famines, the genocides, terrorism, the nuclear warfare, the Guerrilla warfare – and the perpetrators of these horrors were the world's most advanced and enlightened nations. Recognition of this terrible reality – shows that mankind has not really progressed under liberal democracy and global capitalism.

Based on the above, the paper find out that there have emerged some ideologies that fault the claims of the liberal ideology. Although communism has passed from the scene, but powerful challengers to democracy have not. Our political philosophers envision a vast historical dialectic in which the ideal liberal democratic solution is ultimately produced by the centuries-long struggle of worldviews. It goes without saying that many people are inclined to think that the cold war ended the way it did because the better world view won out, as it had to, and that the current international order is just the next step in humanity's journey from conflict and aggression to peaceful and prosperous coexistence.

Since the mid – 1990s, the nascent democratic transformation in Russia has given way to what may best be described as a "czarist" political system, in which all important decisions are taken by one man and his powerful coterie. Vladimir Putin and his spokesmen speak of democracy, but they define the term much as the Chinese do. For Putin, democracy is not so much about competitive elections as about the implementation of

the popular will. The regime is democratic because the government consults with and listens to the Russia people, discern what they need and want, and then attempts to give it to them.

Thus, autocracy in Russia and China has fought the claims of the liberal ideology. A majority of Russians and Chinese seem content with autocratic rule, at least for now. Unlike communism, Putin's rule does not impinge much on their personal lives if they stay out of politics.

Putin has created a guiding national philosophy out of the correlation between power abroad and autocracy at home. He calls Russia a "sovereign democracy", a term that neatly encapsulates Russia's return to greatness, it escapes from the impositions of the west, and its adoption of an "eastern" model of democracy. In Putin's view, only a great and powerful Russia is strong enough to defend and advance its interests, and also strong enough to resist foreign demands for western political reforms that Russia neither needs nor wants (Kagan, 2009, p.55).

Another ideology that has succeeded in faulting the claims of the liberal ideology is the radical Islamist ideology. Today the radical Islamist is the last holdout against these powerful forces of western liberal democracy. Islamic resistance to liberal ideology is not a new phenomenon, after all, though it has taken on a new and potentially cataclysmic dimension. The radical Islamist had faulted liberal ideology claims of regular elections in a democracy. This made Abu Musab al – Zaqawi denounced elections in Iraq on the grounds that "the legislator who must be obeyed in a democracy is man and not God". He stated that "democracy make the weak ignorant man God's partner in his most central divine prerogative – namely, ruling and legislating". One of the aim of the radical Islamist is to "sweep all the alien and infidel accretions that had been imposed on the Muslim land and peoples in the era of alien dominance and influence and to restore the true and divinely given Islamic order". One of those "infidel accretions" is western liberal democracy.

Thus, the paper concludes that the liberal ideology is faced with the prospect of a protracted struggle with the autocracies from Russia, China and other third world countries. The liberal ideology claims have also been faulted by the radical Islamists that have faulted liberal institutional creations like elections etc. Such delusions are dangerously plausible; the liberal democratic concept and the free market are undoubtedly strong. If all else is equal, they should ultimately triumph over opposing viewpoints due to their capacity to provide tangible benefits and, more significantly, their appeal to the most potent part of human nature, the need for individual

autonomy, acceptance, and freedom of thought and conscience.

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