

Peace Building: Conceptual, Trajectory and Imperative Analyses in the Third World Countries

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Abstract

Peace building has undergone series of changes across the globe, most times with special interest on the third world countries. Therefore, the intent of this paper is to conceptualise the peace building architecture with insights from empirical works in the third world countries; examine the trajectory of peace building with examples across cultures; and explicate the rationale behind its imperativeness within local communities in the third world countries. The quest for peace building in developing countries remains a requisite action because interactions among the people, groups and communities are, more often, flawed by numerous social vices. Hence, the imperativeness of peace building becomes thus essential so as to establish resolution strategies, thereby thwarting the menace of vengeance in the societies.

Key words: Peace building; Third World Countries; Peace building trajectory; Imperativeness

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INTRODUCTION

In modern time, peace building came to limelight in 1970, when a Norwegian scholar Johan Galtung firstly termed peace building through his campaign for a cooperative system that would build sustainable peace (United

Nations Peace Building Support Office (UNPBSO), 2012). The peace building system aimed at addressing the root causes of conflict and supporting local capacity for peace management and conflict resolution. This, however, was not an entirely new notion; rather it was to be modernised so as to meet the contemporary challenges of the social world.

In the 80s, the relevance of local governance in peace building was however advocated by an American Sociologist, John Paul Lederach, who added a local involvement to the concept of peace building, such as engaging grassroots people and governments, Non-Governmental Organisations, International and other actors to create a sustainable peace process. This period saw the emergence of the hybrid efforts from the indigenous and foreign actors in peace building exercise. The traditional peace building mechanisms were revisited and credence was lent to their established resolution mechanisms capable of addressing the factors driving conflict with a view to reducing structural or direct violence (Keating, 2004). Peace building has, since then, been expanded to include several dimensions, such as rehabilitation, disarmament, deradicalisation, reintegration, reconstruction, rebuilding governmental, and re-invigorating of social, economic and civil society institutions.

In the 90s, concerted efforts were geared towards peace building by the International agencies, such as European Union (EU), and the formerly United Nations Organisations (UNO), as well as the formerly Organisation of African Unity (OAU), e.t.c with the aim of creating supportive environment for countries that were just coming out of governance crises - military incursions, Civil war and racism - as well as restoration of peace after the Gulf war. During this period, peace building activities were targeted at ensuring durable peace by reconciling with war opponents, preventing the re-insurgence of conflicts among warring parties, creating rule of law

mechanisms for peace sustainability and addressing the underlying structural and societal issues.

While in the late 90s and early 21st century, the multi-sectoral strategy was adopted in peace building efforts which includes guaranteeing proper financing, effective communication system and goal-oriented coordination mechanisms between security agencies, humanitarian assistance, judicial institutions, development partners, other local institutions of governance. This was propagated in the general assembly through UNO Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 1992 report *An Agenda for Peace*. However, subsequent peace building efforts still had more of international strategic outlook, and was not remarkably domesticated; it was only the view of Lederach that recognised the integration of local governance, which was later overtaken in the early 90s, but not until 2005 World summit.

From the World Summit in 2005 when Kofi Annan's proposal provided an insight into the creation of peace building architecture by the United Nations (UN) (Barnett, Kim, O'Donnell & Sitea, 2007). The proposal called for the establishment of three (3) supportive organisations: the UN Peace building Commission, which was founded in 2005; the UN Peace building Support Office, which was created in 2005; and the UN Peace building Fund, founded in 2006.

Arising from the formation of the three (3) organisations, UNPBSO outlined the strategies of peace building, mostly practicable by institutions of governance within local communities in the third world countries. These include: quick response; mediation of differences; cross-examination of disputants; negotiation; reconciliation; transitional justice and restoration (communal adjudication); ethnic cooperation; building bridges between different communities (community dialogue); re-integrating former combatants into civilian society; developing rule of law systems and local governance systems; management of post-conflict local environments; and developing pressure and civil society groups as well as community-based organisations that can represent diverse interests and challenge the governments peacefully (UNPBSO, 2012). These strategies were stressed to be useful before communal conflict as peace-making mechanisms and after the conflict as peace-keeping techniques (Barnett, Kim, O'Donnell & Sitea, 2007).

The crux of this paper is that, in spite of these peace enforcement strategies, most local communities in Africa, Asia, and Latin America (Third World Countries) are yet to enjoy long-term, sustained and durable peace (Okoro, 2014; MacGinty, 2013). They most often experience a serious breakdown of civil order, partisan rejection of constitutional arrangement, severe *coup d'état*, civil war, ethnic crisis, political assassinations and political violence of varying degrees (Omoleke & Olaiya, 2015 quoted in Geddes, 2011). These social disorders place

enormous tasks on the local institutions of governance in the Third-World countries. Thus, the intent of this paper is to conceptualise the peace building architecture with insights from empirical works in the third world countries; examine the trajectory of peace building with examples across cultures in the World; and explicate the rationale behind its imperativeness within local communities in the third world countries.

1. CONCEPTUAL ISSUES ON PEACE BUILDING

Peace building could be traced to the field of peace studies more than thirty years ago. In 1975, Johan Galtung coined the term in his pioneering work "Three Approaches to Peace: Peace-keeping, Peace-making, and Peace building" (Peace Building Initiative History, 2017). In this article, he analysed peace building as:

... a comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates, and sustains the full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships. The term thus involves a wide range of activities that both precede and follow formal peace accords. Metaphorically, peace is seen not merely as a stage in time or a condition. It is a dynamic social construct ... The process of building peace must rely on and operate within a framework and a time frame defined by sustainable transformation ... a sustainable transformative approach suggests that the key lies in the relationship of the involved parties, with all that the term encompasses at the psychological, spiritual, social, economic, political and military levels. (p 20, 75, 84-85)

This concept came to limelight when Boutros Boutros-Ghali's landmark *An Agenda for Peace* was published in 1992. In the piece, peace building was defined as "a process that facilitates the establishment of durable peace and tries to prevent the recurrence of violence by addressing root causes and effects of conflict through reconciliation, institution building and political as well as economic transformation" (Boutros-Ghali, 1992, p. 4, cited in Peace Building Initiative History, 2017).

Peace building is an effort of humanitarian assistance in its differing contexts. This sounds truism because the concept is meant to rebuild the collapsed communities, groups, institutions as well as infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife. The end result of the concept is to unite groups, communities and institutions formerly at war, with bonds of peaceful mutual benefit. In the largest sense, peace building is an organised effort aimed at uprooting the deepest causes of conflict. In this regard, the exercise of peace building is an inclusive one. It addresses all phases of conflict by strengthening the techniques for the institutionalisation of peace.

Brahimi Report on UN Peace Operation in 2000 also refined the definition of peace building:

schedules were taken on the prolonged conflict to reinvigorate the basis of peace and provide the instruments for building

on those foundations so as to achieve something that is more than just the absence of war. It also made a complementary inscription to the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) political emphasis and UNDP developmental emphasis of the concept by stating that “effectiveness of peace building is an integrated consequence of political and development activities targeted at the main sources of conflict. (para 44)

In 2001, the UN Security Council clarified the wide notion of peace building. The concept was aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or continuation of conflict. Peace building is, therefore, a focus on a broad range of peace-oriented activities such as eradication of poverty and inequalities, fostering sustainable development, transparent and accountable governance, the promotion of democracy, the promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, as well as respect for human rights and the rule of law. In accordance with the 2001 UN notion on peace building, Hänggi (2005) thus stated that:

peace building implies not only keeping ex-combatants from going back to war, but also addressing the root causes of conflict and even fostering development and the promotion of democracy in countries not affected by conflict. In fact, many peace building activities are somewhat similar to those of development institution or promotion of democracy. However, peace building is a conflict-sensitive mechanism, which makes peace building an instrument for conflict management, prevention and post-conflict reconstruction (p.11).

Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2006) advanced the course of peace building by exposing that some scholars and organisations, including the UN Peace building Commission, tended to see peace building as applicable only to post-conflict situations. As these prominent scholars explained:

Peace building underpins the work of peace-making and peace-keeping by addressing structural issues and the long-term relationships between conflicting groups. Peace building, according to this view, occurs at the end of a conflict’s “life cycle,” when armed hostilities cease, a negotiated agreement is in force, and international peacekeepers are present. So far, the Peace building Commission has adopted this “post-conflict” lens of peace building. But, as Boutros Boutros-Ghali had envisioned, “peace building, whether preventive or post-conflict, [may be] undertaken in relation to a potential or past conflict without any peace-keeping operation being deployed.” In short, what he suggested and most existing research has been confirming is that peace building should not be limited to post-conflict situations, nor should it be confined to averting a relapse into conflict. Such a restrictive conceptualisation may, paradoxically, undermine the prospects for sustainable peace. (p. 30)

Barnett *et. al* (2007), in their work titled, *Peace building: What Is in a Name?*, identified several International Organisations that have offered conceptual views to peace building across the globe. Just to mention a few, Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces (DND/CF) sees peace building as “actions to support political, economic, social and military measures aimed at strengthening political stability, which include

mechanisms to identify and support structures that promote peaceful conditions, reconciliation, a sense of confidence and well-being, and support economic growth”.

Also, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) referred to peace building as “efforts to strengthen the prospects for internal peace and decrease the likelihood of violent conflict in order to enhance the indigenous capacity of a society to manage conflict without violence”. Moreso, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) averred that “a general approach extending from conflict prevention to reconciliation and post-conflict reconstruction, in which peace is pursued through across-the-board endeavours that include development assistance in addition to traditional efforts within the military and political framework”. The above-mentioned definitional point of views seems to confirm the multi-dimensional approaches and strategies of peace building.

UNDP has peace building as one of its main components of organisational mandates. In this light, UNDP (2010, p.25) noted that peace building entails efforts to support a country’s transition from conflict to sustainable peace, with a stable political order and institutions in place, the risk of relapse into conflict seriously reduced and the country able to move to more stable development processes. Therefore, strategies for peace building must be fashioned to the specific needs of the concerned environments. It is a sequenced set of activities which is carefully prioritised with the aim of achieving the peaceful co-existence objectives.

In Africa, Darfur Australia Network (2008, p.2), owing to their active involvement in peace restoration in Darfur, Sudan, explained that peace building is a contemporary term that refers to activities aimed at creating the bases of peace, and providing vibrant mechanisms for sustaining its practicalities. Peace building includes taking cognisance of conflictual issues in human relations, improving respect for fundamental human rights, reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, strengthening the rule of law, improving security forces, promoting peaceful dispute solving and reconciliation techniques, as well as providing technical assistance for democratic development.

Enu and Ugwu (2011) adopted the joint clarification of Checkel (1997) and Conteh-Morgan (2005) to advance that the most sustained form of peace building is the one that endeavours to understand the exact nature of communal elements which are vulnerable to conflicts. These elements must be recurrently ameliorated so as not to give room for tensions to arise from the elements. There are individual sources of human insecurity. This comprises harmful actions which are directed towards people mostly with visible and immediate consequences. Examples abound in lootings, banditry, and intense communal strife, among others, with women and children being the most defenseless.

For this reason, human security is a central precondition for sustained peace building at any point in time. This, in turn, provides the groundwork for regional peace and international stability. It, however, needs national security scheme because the international peace can only be enhanced on the premise of inter-geopolitical/zonal peace and stability. In the same vein, national peace would only be guaranteed if the constituent states engender local peace built on safeguarded communities.

Since the term peace building has been broadened in scope, it has thus become open to eclectic debates. This sometimes makes it suffer infringements from its contested usage. Nonetheless, analytical deficiencies are not strong enough to wither away its policy implications and practical benefits. In most instances, the description and methodology adopted depends largely on the institutional interests of the stakeholders involved, most of whom are community-based (Hänggi, 2005; Darfur Australia Network, 2008; Peace building Initiative History, 2017). For systematic purposes, it is, however, helpful to acknowledge the broader concept of peace building which goes beyond conflict management. It encompasses varied mechanisms for resolution of conflict before escalation, as well as prevention of its re-insurgence.

However, a distinction can be made on the modest objective of the concept of peace building. It is classical to prevent the start or resurgence of conflict and to create the conditions necessary for a sustainable peace in societies. The multi-disciplinary approach of the concept aims not only at avoiding the recurrence of war, but also at strengthening the fabric of peace through political, socio-economic and cultural development as well as democratic institutions building.

1. TRAJECTORY OF PEACE BUILDING ACROSS CULTURES

The genesis for peace building, in a pragmatic sense, dates back to the early human civilisation. However, the term peace building was at first introduced through UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his report to the Security Council, Agenda for Peace, in 1992. Since then, the policies of donors, multilateral and regional organisations have included peace enhancement framework. Emergency and developmental non-governmental organisations have also come to play a crucial role in peace building activities.

Political analysts and practitioners have a general agreement concerning the importance of the state collapse phenomenon in contemporary world politics (Lemay-Hébert & Toupin, 2011). The rubric of state collapse hosts a number of important issues, including transnational crime; international terrorism; human security threats; ethnic conflict; as well as ecological degradation (Holsti, 1996; Kaldor, 2001). Indeed, the growing number of

intra-state conflicts, weakness, and failure of states in governance system has been the central cause of crisis war in the present international arena.

About a billion people are living in dysfunctional states, according to Ghani and Lockhart (2008) rendered feeble by a “sovereignty gap” – the disconnectedness between the *de jure* assumption that all states are sovereign regardless of their performance in practice (Ghani & Lockhart, 2008). Except for Mehler and Ribaux (2000), Doornbos (2003), Herbst (2004), and Raeymaekers (2005), reconstruction of the state is a child of necessity, as its external assistance seems required for the collapsed state in a transitional period.

The crux of peace building is to detect and assist both political and socio-economic structures that will harness and sustain peace in order to circumvent a relapse into conflict. It goes beyond crisis intervention as it emphasises future implications such as longer-term development, and building of governance structures and institutions. In this respect, it is a good preceding concept to the state building which is more generic in nature. For Zartman (1995, p. 270-272), state collapse referred to “situations where the law, structure, political order and authority (legitimate power) have been in disarray and must be rebuilt in some form, old or new ... As the authoritative political institution, (the collapsed state) has lost its legitimacy, which is therefore up for grabs, and so has lost its right to command and conduct public affairs.”

More often than not, a combination of intra-and inter-state conflict has a main contributory effect on political violence and the state collapse. Hence, peace building, according to Doyle (2000), aims to address the sources of current resentment and institutionalise local capacities for conflict resolution. The prospects for peaceful governance are measurable on the basis of broader political participation, stronger state institutions, respect for ethnic identities, a deepening of civil society, and land reform.

However, peace building has been broadly used to connote the activities that step beyond crisis intervention such as building of governance structures and institutions as well as longer-term development, to the extent that Roland Paris as explained by Lemay-Hébert and Toupin (2011), stated that nowadays the definition of peace building has not been universally accepted while Charles-Philippe David considers that definition of peace building are as many as the number of experts on the field (Paris, 2000).

The incorporation of a strategic approach accentuates the viability of the concept of peace building. Peace building could either be seen as “transformative”, or simply as a stop-gap measure, even though there is a strong probability of experiencing a re-occurrence in conflict. This is mostly occasioned by the failure of the peace agreement due to unstable political and socio-economic situations (Lemay-Hébert & Toupin, 2011). This is consistent with the data collected by Roy Licklider

and Paul Collier among others, showing that about 25% of all peace agreements fail in the first five years after institutional commitment and nearly 50% fail within ten years (Licklider, 1995; Collier, 2003). This necessitates integrated strategies for peace building.

The increased complexity of post-conflict environments gave rising sentience to the state collapse phenomenon in the 1990s. There have been significant calls to react to these urgencies with coherent multilateral responses (Lemay-Hébert & Toupin, 2011). The 2004 Utstein Study of peace building revealed that more than 336 peace building projects implemented by top European countries over the previous decade were identified to suffer inconsistency and lack of coherence at the strategic level, which was termed “strategic deficit,” as the most significant hindrance to sustainable peace building. The Utstein study found also that more than 55% of the programmes, it evaluated, did not show any significant correlation to a larger country strategy (Smith, 2004). The integrated mission concept was intended to address this deficiency.

The UN, according to Lemay-Hébert and Toupin (2011), began to scrutinise the theoretical issue of “rebuilding war-torn societies” between 1992-1993, which coincides loosely with the collapse of both Somalia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). The effort of United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) led to the first research-preparatory workshop on this theme in April 1993, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) designed a program on “Linking Rehabilitation to Development: Management Revitalisation of War-torn Societies” around the same time (Doornbos, 2003).

The UNDPKO was created in 1992 under the leadership of Boutros Boutros-Ghali who also envisioned new perspectives for the development of peace building operations. UN sometimes experimented with peace missions that entailed peace building activities in the Congo (1960-1964), Cyprus (since 1964) and Lebanon (since 1978), most peace missions during the Cold War involved traditional activities of interposition between warring countries’ forces or supervision of ceasefire agreements (Thakur & Thaker, 1995). With the emergent role of Security Council after 1988, Lemay-Hébert and Toupin (2011) noted that no less than 14 new peace missions came to the limelight in a four-year period, compared to the 13 that stood up between 1948 and 1988. Quickly enough, the UN found itself embroiled in complex environments without coherent strategies, which subsequently led to “crises of expectations” in the mid-to-late 90s (Thakur & Thaker, 1995).

The Brahimi Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations extolled the necessity to reinforce the peace building structures inside the UN while providing the institution with a clear doctrine. Without institutional changes, the UN will not be capable of, as stated by UN

(2000), “implementing the critical peace-keeping and peace building tasks that the Member States assign it in subsequent years”. To resolve these challenges, promotion of integrative policies becomes the operation norms of UN. The UN Report on Integrated Missions defines an integrated mission as “an toolkit with which the UN help countries in the transition from crisis to enduring peace, or to cross-check similar complex situations that require a system-wide UN response, through subsuming different actors and approaches within an overall political-strategic crisis management framework.”

In other words, the requirement of an integrated mission hinges on the development of a principal strategic vision of each peace operation and to garner all the necessary tools available across the UN system to achieve those goals (Munro, 2008). An integrated mission is therefore defined “as a framework which has a shared vision among key UN actors as to the strategic objective of the UN presence at country level” (UN, 2006, p. 2). Regarding the report on UN reform on Larger Freedom, the then Secretary-General Kofi Annan acknowledged that a “gaping hole” was observed in the institutional machinery of the UN: “...No part of the United Nations system effectively addresses the challenge of helping countries with the transition from war to lasting peace” (UN, 2005, para 114).

The Peace building Commission was established in 2005 with a view to tackling conflictual issue across the globe, notably to “... propose and counsel on integrated strategies for peace building and reclamation [and] with more emphasis on the institution-building and social reconstruction efforts crucial for recovery from ravaging communal conflict and support the development of integrated strategies with a view to erect solid foundation for sustainable development at the local level” (UN, 2005, para 2). For this reason, the new UN doctrine places a high premium on the design of the local innovative peace building architecture. According to Collier (2003, p. 45), it reflects “an emergent recognition within the international community of the linkages between the two cognate operational areas of peace building: peace-making and peace-keeping. In this regards, the Peace building Commission helps to marshal the resources at the disposal of the international community and provide advice on integrated strategies for peace building and recovery.” In so doing, the Peace building Commission has, in a way, helped in gathering the resources with comprehensive strategies to support conflict-prone countries in the world. Since its birth, the focus of the Peace building Commission has been noticeable on the cases of Liberia, Central African Republic, Burundi, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau.

In 2008, the International Peace Institute and International Cooperation at New York University reported a number of challenges, out of which inadequate coordination by international agencies and continental

unions was found to be significant. Yet, a modest number of positive results were still observed by the reports of the two Institutes (NYU, 2008). A more critical tone was adopted in the review of the UN peace building architecture while anticipating that the report would serve as a “wake-up call” to the international communities to assist in strengthening the collective tenacity to embark on peace building in a more inclusive and resolute way (UN, 2010).

The codification and implementation agenda of using development assistance was another turning point for international community with a view to promoting peace building and reconciliation exercise in countries that are just coming out of violent conflict. The first example of these scenarios could be spotted in Uganda, El Salvador, and Cambodia more than a decade ago. But, the mid-1990s only saw its fully-fledged field with the emergence of its new institutions. Furthermore, the 1997 OECD Guidelines on Peace, Conflict and Development Cooperation and the 1998 UN Secretary General’s report on Priorities for Post-Conflict Peace building are the two important documents which give foremost concerns to areas, which until a few years ago, were entirely in deviance with the development agenda or at least very marginal on justice and security; governance and representation; prejudice and reconciliation (Nicole, 2000; Hendrickson 2002; Lemay-Hébert & Toupin, 2011; Urvin, 2012). However, the exceptional nature of peace building should emphasise permanent re-configuration rather than temporary one with social, political and economic contexts of governance.

One of its six strategic themes of World Bank is the identification of conflict-affected countries and fragile states so as to achieve inclusive and sustainable globalisation. In April 2008, the World Bank catalysed its obligation by creating the State and Peace-Building Fund (SPF). This was to replace the 1998 Post-Conflict Fund (PCF) and the 2004 Low Income Countries under Stress Trust Fund (LICUSTF). The twin aims of the fund are to improve institutional performance and governance system; as well as, support the rehabilitation and development of countries prone to or emerging from conflict. The financial commitment of Board of Directors to the provision was US\$100 million from the World Bank’s own administrative budget for the period 2009-2011, with seamless fund contributions from Norway, Netherlands and Switzerland (Coning, 2013).

Earlier in 2004, the strategic framework on peace building was released by the Norwegian government with three main goals: economic and social development, security, and political development. Since then, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has prioritised peace building as its key components with the aid of Multi-lateral approaches. In volatile states, there is a notable synergy and intimate cooperation between the UN system and Norway with NATO, the World Bank and NATO, and some other

continental organisations such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and African Union (AU) (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004). Until this period, intergovernmental assistance is a major coordinating instrument of peace building. At a point, this organisational apparatus becomes difficult as a result of weak institutions and poor governance. In its replacement, the use of multilateral channels was thereafter considered as a way to help vulnerable groups in crisis-prone areas.

It was however observed that the dearth of understanding of what the UN peace building architecture entails and its application or usability has been a key factor contributing to the poor sustainability of peace building efforts by donor countries and incoherence (Coning, 2013). Although, one of the main objectives of the peace building architecture was to establish the mechanisms for supporting sustainability of peace enhancement effort, however according to 2009 UN Secretary General’s report on peace building in the aftermath of conflict, the principle of sustainability has not emerged to its efficacy level in most conflict zones (McCandless, 2010). Hence, the medium to long-term sustainability gains less support from peace building architecture as a result of its irregular prioritisation and configuration of peace sustainability efforts across the globe.

In Africa, the AU’s involvement in peace building, in the past few years, has been consistent due to constant political and socio-religious crisis ravaging most African communities. These peace building activities are carried out in collaboration with the Regional Economic Communities (RECS), which has designed a Peace and Security Architecture for African countries, much like the UN Peace building Architecture, to manage, prevent and resolve conflicts in Africa. Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework is one of the most discernible features of the AU’s engagement in peace building, which rests on five key principles: national and local ownership; African leadership; inclusiveness; capacity building for sustainability equity and non-discrimination; and cooperation and coherence (Licklider, 1995; AU, 2007).

The concern in Africa seems to be more in the localisation of the peace building process. This African context of peace building can be understood as a process where the solutions to respective society’s problems are designed in concert with the individuals who are living with these problems, and who are to uphold the proffered solutions in the long run (Hansen & Wiharta, 2007). To this end, the broad objective of the AU peace and security architecture is to institutionalise indigenous solutions to African problems. However, this African Peace building Architecture (APA) seems to be poised with difficulties of weak institutional structures, inadequate resources amidst other challenges among countries in Africa.

Nonetheless, the roles of sub-regional organisations have been recognised at the international level in the

maintenance and sustenance of desirable peace and security (Aning, 2008). However, just like the UN vision of a mutually-reinforcing and global-regional mechanism for peace and security, APA challenges remain to transform constructive peace framework into the sustainability of peace. The global-regional approach is observed to have been strategically impeded by politically-selective, improvised and resource-skewed approaches (Aning, 2008). There is a notable recognition of the role of civil society groups in the act of peace building across the globe. This is because the centrality of civil society remains unwavering to conflict resolution. The establishment of civil society remains a keystone for building peace as outlined in the *Agenda for Peace*. Civil society embraces institutional forms as well as the diversity of spaces and actors, varying in their degree of power, formality, and autonomy (Pouligny, 2005). This definition provides a broad conceptual sense which extends more beyond semi-formally constituted groups.

Also, the involvement of international groups in peace building could be traced to the early 1990s. International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) have assumed continuous leadership responsibilities in efforts of building peace. The complementary roles of INGOs have immense support for peace building activities and, therefore, become indispensable to the resolution of conflict thereby strengthening the processes of peace building. There is an increasing engagement of INGOs with state actors as evident in humanitarian assistance being channeled through these international groups. Their essential partnership with the UN and regional unions has been so supportive in mobilising public opinion, deliberation process, policy formulation and in their adequate implementation exercises (Kaldor, 1999; Fitzdurff, 2005; McCandless, 2010). Yet, the effective synergy among INGOs and with other peace building players has been identified among other challenges on divergent ideologies and scarcity of resources, etc.

However, most of the INGOs have faced a lot of criticisms by local groups for implementing the agenda of their affiliations, especially in the peace building sphere, rather than maintaining non-alignment status (Fitzdurff, 2005). The principles of liberal peace have been largely promoted by INGOs and which has been placed on the same pedestal, or above with both local and international agencies. Peace building Commission (2011) provided an example of INGOs such as the Pearson Peace-keeping Center (PPC), which has consistently been working in partnership with many African and Latin American countries to build their institutional capacity and professionalise the local institutions. One of the flagship areas of PPC expertise is to develop the capacity of gender and women groups so as to provide assistance to victims of gender-based violence and assist the local security operatives investigating gender-based crimes and violence. In addition, Mofasony (2012) expressed

that the engagement of PPC with the UNDPKO aimed at supporting the possibilities for indigenous peace building organisations and networks at most vulnerable localities in Africa, Latin America, and Asia.

Not only PPC, many INGOs have been involved in this type of programming with various sectors, such as radio networks World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters, Journalists for Human Rights, community outreach programs that build local capacity (e.g International Women's Tribune Center (IWTC)), among others. The usage of blogs, wikis and other forms of social and alternative media are part of the INGOs' operational tools to communicate information about crisis and conflict issues, and to hear voices of the downtrodden via the mainstreamed media (Noll, 2013).

The partnership of INGOs with women's groups in Uganda, Kenya, Liberia and elsewhere has, on the one hand, brought about series of radio programmes called Women Talk Peace which is aired to sensitise the people on the impact of war on women and, on the other hand, the role of women in conflict resolution and sustainable peace as guided by United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325. The development of 'hand in hand' with women's groups is a major outcome of radio programmes. The women empowerment of IWTC centres on involvement of women in public policy arena, building democratic societies and redefining development paradigms (Mofasony, 2012; Peace building Commission, 2011).

An example of *Ushahidi* in Kenya could be cited for a better understanding of peace building partnership. This group was charged with the responsibilities of gathering reports on violence in Kenyan post-election in 2008. *Ushahidi* simply means "testimony" in the Swahili language. Technology was a veritable instrument of this group. Internet platform, web, and mobile phones have offered tremendous assistance in the reportage of violent incidents and peace reconciliation exercise in Kenya, Haiti among other countries. UN peace-keepers, INGOs and *Ushahidi* have engaged in several peace building partnerships mainly to identify and assist people in distress (Chigozie & Ituma, 2015). Such initiatives, however, build on the report mapping strategies of *Ushahidi* in peace building efforts.

Across the continents, the role of women in peace building, amidst other approaches, such as storytelling, reformations, and military as well as other democratic mechanisms, could not be downplayed. In 2009, when the Security Council adopted UNSCR 1889, the Secretary-General was asked to produce a report on women gender participation in peace building. The report emphasised the significant role of women in the actualisation of the three pillars of lasting peace: social cohesion, political legitimacy, and economic recovery (Secretary-General Report as cited in Urvin, 2012; Sanz & Tomlinson, 2012). The report also went further to highlight key impeding

factors to women's participation in public and political life, such as gender stereotypes, lack of economic opportunities, threats to their physical safety, poor educational attainment, domestic responsibilities and the lack of adequate time for socialisation. However, women's opportunities can be better enhanced through the gender-friendly setting of priorities and the use of peace building resources.

A noble sample of an association for women in peace building is the Global Network of Women's Peacebuilders (GNWP). GNWP has a potent target for providing synergy between policy discussions (Security Council), implementation (governments) and action (women's groups) on women, peace and security issues. A great success has been recorded in synergising the role of grassroots' women peacebuilders to complement the activities of national and international actors on peace building.

Remarkably, the broad use of peace building concept appears evident in its multifarious nature across borders with its worthwhile contribution to humanitarian assistance and development goals. Moreover, a variety of peace building efforts have been put in place by several groups at local, national and international levels. The tasks of peace building are continuously becoming complex due to the dynamic nature through which conflict ensues in different communities. The importance of emerging approaches is however remarkable with the numerous actors involved in the process. Yet, challenges are still associated with social coherence and collaboration among individuals, groups, and communities. Hence, the quest for peace building now is to address existent challenges and engender a larger consensus on peace building. The growing acknowledgment that the attainments of peace building efforts hinge on strong local assembly while the national and international agencies can, after all, only help to support and sustain peace building.

2. IMPERATIVENESS OF PEACE BUILDING IN THE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

Peace building becomes a requisite action when the relationships of individuals, groups, and communities are notably flawed or when elements of injustice are being committed (Best, 2005; Udeso, 2013). The reparative mechanisms of peace building are thus to establish a resolution strategy, not to revenge. The growing resort to a peace settlement is the vocal viewpoint of peace building in crisis-torn communities across the globe, most especially in developing countries. Conflict cases have been most protracted in those parts of the World owing to non-exhaustive factors. Obiekwe (2009) rooted the broad rationale behind the conflict in Third-World countries to the dynamic conditions of bi-polar global rule,

colonialism re-orientation, much of ethnic and religious fragmentation, the ineptitude of government to correct political imbalance and corrupt institutions.

The insurgence of conflict most often has a sporadic effect on neighbouring communities through the instrumentality of religious allegiances, ethnic relations, migrations of fighters, the influx of refugees from violent communities and economic interest across the borders of the warring states. Examples of these are evident in civil wars of Syria, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and the long protracted unrest in Israel and Palestine (Best, 2005), as well as the implication of civil uproar of Casamance Region which transcends instability into Senegal, Gambia, and Sierra-Leone (Conciliation Resources, 2012). This underlines the fact that a slight mishap has a high tendency, if not timely mitigated, to skyrocket across borders. This poses a threat to regional stability and integration.

In Africa, exact instances of conflicts which developed into interior wars include Sudan, Zaire, Rwanda, Lesotho, Burundi, Liberia, and Uganda, to mention but a few; turmoil in Cote D' Ivoire; state /rebels conflicts in Serra Leone, Angola and Guinea Bissau; genocide in Somali; and border conflict between Cameroon and Nigeria (Bakassi Peninsula). International Colloquium Report (2012) cited in Oguonu and Ezeibe (2014) also observed the increase in civil unrest in Africa after the end of Cold War. In fact, 70% of wars in Africa were intra-state in nature, with the continent hosting about 50% of all civil wars in the whole World (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). The high concentration of civil wars in most developing World necessitates the imperativeness of peace building framework and strategies in the conflict zones.

In Asia, there is an endless political, socio-economic and communal intra and inter-battle among groups, traditional associations, and regions, including the endless battle between governments and trade unions as well as multinational companies in the regions. This showcases the unpleasant and unfriendly situation which, without being told, calls for free dispute resolution services, just like other situational countries across the globe. Akpuru-Aja (2011) argued that the tasks of managing conflicts in Africa at large have suffered profound difficulties, despite high emphasis and campaign on elements of open society, such as peace, justice, stability, and security of the political system.

A cross-sectional review of available literature shows the extensive analysis of how conflict-prone environments could be transformed into peace-reigning ones. Most recommendations on the institutionalisation of peace building drew from the structural framework of Lederach's peace building approach. The identity-rooted nature of conflicts in Nigeria, just like other Africa countries' conflicts, has been elucidated. However, certain resolution mechanisms appear obvious and ubiquitous. Conflict transformation most often requires

third-party involvement as means of mediating with the cultural epistemology of the people (Obiekwu, 2009). This should not be absolute, as it is mostly practised; however, it still does not propose non-involvement of external mediators in resolving conflicts in Nigerian communities; rather a collaboration with the indigenous institutions should be respected.

Also, one of the important processes of peace sustainability is to construct or anchor a peace constituency or the peace building process around local actors or home-grown mediators. Lederach's elicitive approach, explained by Best (2005), emphasised the significance of local institutions in conflict transformation and peace building. Although, in spite of its critical institutional need for arresting conflicts in developing World, it requires all-inclusive and organic roles of multiple actors involved in the conflict. However, several questions have been raised as to what are the imperative institutional measures to be put in place in the process of peace building at the local level.

Lederach, observed by Johnston (2003) and Obiekwe (2009), has introduced a more persuasive conceptual framework into the field of peace building which explains the pyramidal and analytic structure of peace stakeholders and their roles in the process of peace building across the population strata of community involved in the conflict. He stratified the population of society alongside the existing three vertical levels and thereby categorising the peace leaders vis-à-vis their different roles, such as top level, middle-range and grassroots peace facilitators. This tripartite framework aimed at capturing conflict-ensuing from any of the population or societal strata.

At the top of the pyramid, this level constitutes the top peace actors who are elites in the society domineering military, religious and political spheres. This level has a low number of people compared to the middle and grassroots levels. However, few actors at this level command public attention and enjoy constant social recognition from the media, as well as legitimacy and social respect from local institutions (Wolfsfeld, 2003; Howard, 2012). Sometimes, they constitute brains behind the insurgence and resurgence of conflicts due to political power tussle. For instance, the impact of these elites could not hand off *Boko Haram* and Niger-Delta Avengers terrifying the North-eastern and South-southern parts of Nigeria respectively. To this end, these few oligarchies must be engaged and integrated into the official diplomacy and negotiations with the aim of achieving reconciliation and a cease-fire in an on-going violent conflict. Furthermore, Crane (2013) described this top level of Lederach's peace building process as a top-bottom approach. This implies that the dynamics of the few top stakeholders deal with broader political and substantive issues in the conflict. Moreso, the involvement of other strata of the society is a function of these few oligarchies due to the capitalist nature of Nigerian state, just like that of other developing World.

At the second level, personality is a major considerable factor. Actors at this level command respect and authority within their institutional and social settings with little or no control from the constituted authority or governance structure (Cannon, 2009). These middle-level actors are however different from the top-level actors because they are not few, and they do not benefit from the politically aggregated powers; rather, they enjoy a relatively absolute freedom and tractability on their constituting groups and associations, such as ethnic groups, religious associations, NGOs and other professional societies. Leaders of these groups have significant status and influence on their immediate environments with no affiliation and governing calculus of the few oligarchies (Obiekwu, 2009; Noll, 2013). Remarkably, these groups comprise more individuals than the top-level actors. A major strength of these middle groups is that they have dual contact: one with the actors at the top; and the second, with the residents at the grassroots level. This feature places these groups at vantage position on the exercise of intermediate activities in any reconciliatory processes. Hence, the middle peace actors could play active roles in societal problem-solving and peace commissions.

The third level constitutes the masses whose major social concerns hinge on daily survival needs. The symbolic leadership is observed at this level because of the series of engagement with localists' approaches aimed at mitigating the violent effects. They include various local or indigenous leaders of communities, clans, compounds, traditional associations, rural and cultural groups (Wolfsfeld, 2003; Asiyanbola, 2007). These leaders are the first-point of calls on any pathetic instances of the local dwellers. This underlines the solid institutionalisation of peace building process at the local level so as to facilitate communal tolerance and accommodation among residents.

Remarkably, the singular criticism of the Lederach's structural framework for peace building is the more emphasis placed on the top-bottom capacity of the peace enhancement process. Instead, looking at the abridging position of the second actors, intervention of the middle actors seem preferable to the trickling-down process of the top-level actors, because the middle peace actors could easily interfere in peace building and make reports to appropriate higher authorities for consolidation of the decisive peace actions (Olayiwola & Okorie, 2010). Rather, at best, practical reconciliatory ideas and initiative can be locally generated at the grassroots level and bubbled them up to produce unanimously accepted peace process that embraces the views of all stakeholders. A typical example is the case of Ethiopia, El Salvador and especially Somalia, where local peace conferences with representatives of the different clans achieved a series of agreements that generated a similar process at the higher levels. Concrete peace building would seem practicable, since those involved in the conflict are also involved the conflict resolution processes.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

A survey of extant studies revealed the genesis of peace building across the world with a view to analysing the chronological trend of peace enhancement exercise. The reviewed literature emphasised the integration of strategic approach, the inclusive notion of peace as well as the increased complexity of post-conflict environments. In a practical sense, the peace building was geared towards rebuilding war-torn societies with evident examples in Iran, Iraq, Sweden, Timor Leste and Yugoslavia. Remarkably, UN spearheaded intensive efforts towards the resolution of conflict challenges across the countries by promoting integrative policies among all local institutions and their hybridity with external groups in different polities, though subsuming different actors and approaches within an overall political-strategic crisis management framework.

From the reviewed literature, poverty and poor process of development were the main casual indices or indicators of violent conflict in most Third World Countries. The spotlight of peace building in the regions has mostly been incessant with more of its concern on the localisation of the peace movement. The integral role of sub-regional organisations could be categorically extolled in the maintenance of desirable peace and security with a vision of global-regional mechanism for peace and security in collaborations with INGOs. The civil society groups are not left out of the peace building exercise, as they remain keystone for building peace as outlined in the UN *Agenda for Peace*.

Across the Third World Countries, the interjection of storytelling, reformations, women participation, military, and democratic mechanisms could not be downplayed in the process of peace building. In spite of its process attendant on by numerous groups, the tasks of peace building are continuously becoming complex owing to the non-expectant means through which conflict ravages different communities. In this regard, the framework for peace building has been largely designed by international and national agencies with the ultimate intention of facilitating strong awareness against casual factors of conflict and human rights-based approaches to peace building.

The quest for peace building in developing countries remains a requisite action when interactions among the people, groups and communities are flawed by numerous social vices. Moreover, retaliation is most often the order of the day among the conflict-driven people, groups and communities. Hence, the imperativeness of peace building becomes thus essential so as to establish resolution strategies, thereby thwarting the menace of vengeance in the societies.

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