The Implementation and Welfare Effect of Vehicle Quantity Regulation Policy: A Case Study of Beijing Vehicle Quota System
Abstract
The quantity regulation of license plates for small passenger cars is a typical public policy of government intervention in transportation market. The goal of the policy is to control the number of vehicles in a region, with the main purpose of controlling the growth rate of small passenger cars and reduce traffic congestion. This paper takes Beijing as an example to analyze the implementation effect and welfare effect of the vehicle quantity regulation. The analysis results show that the policy implementation is different from Singapore. It can control the rapid growth of small passenger cars in a city from a macro perspective, but it cannot control the growth of vehicles on the road for a city, so it is limited to reduce traffic congestion. On the other hand, the policy of controlling the number of small passenger cars will bring a series of welfare losses. In this regard, this paper puts forward suggestions of improving policy design, increasing supporting policy measures, strengthening urban public transport construction and changing residents’ travel mode to enhance the implementation effect of the policy.
Keywords
Full Text:
PDFReferences
Cao, J., Wang, X., & Zhong, X. H. (2014). Does the limit line policy improve the air quality in Beijing? Economics (Quarterly), (03), 1091-1126.
Chen, Y. F. (2015). The jurisprudential dilemma of motor vehicles’ limitation in the context of governing the country by law-taking the Shenzhen limit order as a specimen. Finance and Economics and Law Information, (03), 50-55.
Chin, A., & Smith, P. (1996). Automobile ownership and government policy: The economics of Singapore’s vehicle quota scheme. Transpn Res.A. 31(2), 129-140.
Chin, A., & Smith, P. (1997). Automobile ownership and government policy: The economics of Singapore’s vehicle quota scheme. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 31(2), 129-140.
Chu, S. (2012). Allocation flexibility and price efficiency within Singapore’s Vehicle Quota System. Transportation Research Part A, 1541-1550.
Chu, S. (2015). Car restraint policies and mileage in Singapore. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 77, 404-412.
Chu, S., & Goh, M. (1997). The price of car ownership in Singapore: an empirical assessment of the COE scheme. International Journal of Transport Economics, 24(3), 457-472.
Fan, L. C. (2015). A legal economic analysis of the vehicle quota policy and its alternatives. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance and Economics, (03), 106-113.
Hepburn, C. (2006). Regulation by prices, quantities, or both: A review of instrument choice. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 22(2), 226-247.
Hou, X., Peng, S. P., & Ma, W. (2013). Comparison of consumer costs in Beijing lottery and Shanghai license plate auction policy. China Soft Science, (11).
Koh, W. T., & Lee, D. K. C. (1994). The vehicle quota system in Singapore: An assessment. Transpn Res.28A.31-47.
Li, S. Y., & Lan, Q. P. (2013). Comparison and enlightenment of license plate “lottery” policy and auction mechanism. Journal of Xichang University(Natural Science Edition), 7(03), 47-59.
Liu, F. L. (2014). Research on the vehicle quota system. Guangzhou: Jinan University.
Managing Urban Traffic Congestion. (2007).Organization for economic co-operation and development; European conference of ministers of transport.
Muthukrishnan, S. (2010). Vehicle ownership and usage charges. Transport Policy, 17(6), 398-408.
Rao, X. Y. (2011). Analysis of the justification of the vehicle quota policy-analysis of the interim provisions on the regulation of the number of small passenger cars in Beijing. Graduate School of Law, (06), 132-141.
Rong, J. X., & Sun, N. (2015). Design of mixed mechanism of vehicle license plate quota-Discussion on improvement of China’s license plate quota mechanism. Studies in Finance and Economics, (12), 62-71.
Seik, F. T. (1998). A unique demand management instrument in urban transport: The vehicle quota system in Singapore. Cities, 15(1), 27-39.
Sheldon, G., & Berman, W. (1995). Congestion Control and Demand Management. Public Roads, 95(2).
Sun, R. (2014). Difficulties and ways out: The “Lottery” policy addresses the problem of urban public resource allocation. Executive Forum, (05), 56-60.
Tan, L. (2003). Rationing rules and outcomes: The experience of Singapore’s vehicle quota system. IMF Staff Papers, 50(3), 436-457.
Weitzman, M. L. (1974). Prices vs. Quantities. The Review of Economic Studies, 41(4), 477-491.
Xuan, C. Y., Ai, W. W., & Zhang, W. (2013). The causes and breakthroughs of the quantity limitation of small passenger cars in large and medium cities in China-Taking Beijing’s “Lottery” system as an example. Management World, (08), 173-174.
Yang, J. J. (2013). The effect of public decision-making and legal compliance-An empirical analysis of “automobile purchase”. Administrative Jurisprudence Research, (03), 63-69.
Yuan, K. F., & Yu. S. H. (2014). Reflections on improving the configuration of China’s vehicle quota system-based on the comparative analysis of Guiyang license plate lottery and Shanghai license plate auction. Price Theory and Practice, (04).
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3968/10723
Refbacks
- There are currently no refbacks.
Copyright (c) 2018 Hanying Qi
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Remind
We are currently accepting submissions via email only.
The registration and online submission functions have been disabled.
Please send your manuscripts to ccc@cscanada.net,or ccc@cscanada.org for consideration. We look forward to receiving your work.
Articles published in Cross-Cultural Communication are licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC-BY).
CROSS-CULTURAL COMMUNICATION Editorial Office
Address: 1055 Rue Lucien-L'Allier, Unit #772, Montreal, QC H3G 3C4, Canada.
Telephone: 1-514-558 6138
Website: Http://www.cscanada.net; Http://www.cscanada.org
E-mail:caooc@hotmail.com; office@cscanada.net
Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture