

## Exposure to Political News Accompanying Violent Demonstrations as Reflected in Adopting Conspiracy View Against Egypt

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Received 13 February 2014; accepted April 19 2014

Published online 27 June 2014

### Abstract

A field study was conducted at time of violent events that accompanied demonstrations against the Military Council who assumed the power to govern Egypt after 25<sup>th</sup> January Revolution to determine the effects of exposure to political news on three dependent variables; public opinion belief in conspiracy theory against Egypt, tolerance and affect towards the two parties of the violence (rebels and the Military Council) through the interim transition of military rule. The study found that Egyptian journalism, other political factors and demographic variables predicted the public's adoption of foreign and domestic conspiracy view whether positively or inversely. Unlike newspapers and online journalism, TV satellite channels were the only source predicting public's tolerance and affect. The study also found correlations between respondents' adoption of conspiracy theory and their tolerance judgments and feelings toward the parties of the conflict.

**Key words:** Conspiracy theory; Affect; Tolerance; Political efficacy; Political involvement; Political participation

Elhadidi, M. A. F. (2014). Exposure to Political News Accompanying Violent Demonstrations as Reflected in Adopting Conspiracy View Against Egypt. *Cross-Cultural Communication*, 10(4), 176-191. Available from: <http://www.cscanada.net/index.php/ccc/article/view/5106>  
DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.3968/5106>

### INTRODUCTION

With the assuming of power in Egypt by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces after President Hosni

Mubarak was ousted on 11 February 2011 as a result of massive demonstrations that lasted 18 days, known as 25 January Revolution, Egypt has witnessed domestic violence and clashes accompanied by either anti-army protests or some internal events. Predominantly major parties in these violent events were protesters and armed forces in time which coincided the idea of conspiracy against Egypt and its revolution, whether this plot from internal or external hands.

Here I mention the most important events of demonstrations led by the revolutionary powers against the Military Council ruling Egypt and its governments through the transitional period till conducting the questionnaire<sup>1</sup>.

On March 5<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup>, protestors raided the several State Security Intelligence (SSI) buildings across Egypt claiming that they wanted to secure documents they believed to show various crimes committed by the SSI against the people during Mubarak's rule. On April 8<sup>th</sup>, 2011, "The Friday of Cleaning", hundreds of thousands of demonstrators filled Al-Tahrir Square in Egypt's capital Cairo and other squares in some Egyptian governorates, criticizing the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces for slowdown in the trial of Mubarak and former regime leaders and demanded the resignation of remaining regime figures and removal of Egypt's public prosecutor. The military forces stormed the field to break up the protest and arrested a number of demonstrators who decided to stay overnight in Al-Tahrir Square.

On May 7<sup>th</sup>, 2011, Salafi Muslims undertook a series of attacks against Coptic Christian churches in the poor working-class neighborhood of Imbaba in Cairo.

<sup>1</sup> All data to enumerate these events were gathered from some Egyptian newspapers: Al-Ahram Newspaper, available at <http://www.gate.ahram.org.eg>; Al-Wafd newspaper, available at <http://www.alwafd.org>; Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper, available at <http://www.almasryalyoum.com>; and Al-Youm Al-Sabea newspaper, available at <http://www.youm7.com>.

This event led Christians and Christian revolutionary movements to organize a sit-open on the front of Union of Egyptian Radio and Television at Maspero area. Christians joined the parties and revolutionary powers on 27 May in the largest demonstrations since ousting Mubarak's Regime in Al-Tahrir Square and other governorates. Protesters called for the "civil state" and demanded no military trials for civilians, and the Egyptian Constitution to be made before the parliamentary elections.

July witnessed four demonstrations on 1, 8, 15, and 23 days organized by hundreds of thousands of protesters gathered in Suez and Alexandria governorates and Al-Tahrir Square demanding immediate reforms and swifter prosecution of former officials from the ousted government. On August 1<sup>st</sup> 2011, Egyptian soldiers clashed with protesters, tearing down tents and arrested tens of them.

On 9 October 2011, thousands of Christians demonstrated in rallies in six Egyptian governorates, most of them went to Maspero building and were joined by thousands of Muslims to condemn the ongoing attacks and demolition of churches. Clashes happened between protestors and security forces and led to death of at least 25 people besides injuring more than 200. The Military Council commented in a press conference that the individuals responsible for the protection of Radio and Television building were not armed and that a "third party" began firing at the armed forces and demonstrators.

On 19 November the events of "Mohamed Mahmoud Street", one of the surroundings of Al-Tahrir Square, witnessed clashes and demonstrations continued until Friday following 25 November. and led to the death of 33 persons at least in addition to 1,700 were injured. After these events some demonstrators protested in the front of the headquarters of the Egyptian Cabinet against the appointment of Kamal Ganzouri as a prime minister. The presence of the protesters in front of Egyptian Cabinet for many days led to skirmishes broke out in 16 December 2011 between them and the forces of the buffer zone of the army and police. The Egyptian Academy was burning because of the throwing of Molotov cocktails. The ministry of health announced that the outcome of the clashes three deaths and 255 injured.

These bloody events that led to the fall of hundreds of victims produced a belief that there is a third party or hidden hands as announced by one of the leaders of the Military Council, the hands that aimed to prevent the cohesion between the army and people and wanted to overthrow the state<sup>2</sup>. The present study tries to monitor the effects of exposure to political news covered in

various categories of the Egyptian newspapers and TV channels beside online journalism on public's adoption of conspiracy theory against Egypt in the light of all internal violent actions caused by demonstrations and sit-ins against the ruling Military Council.

## 1. CONSPIRACY THEORY AND MEDIA EFFECTS

A conspiracy theory is a belief system defined as a proposed plot by powerful people or organizations working together behind the scenes to accomplish some usually sinister goal through deception of the public (Douglas & Sutton, 2008; Goertzel, 1994; Tuckett, 2004; Wood & Douglas, 2013; Wood, Douglas, & Sutton, 2012) in order to withhold the truth about some important practice or some terrible event (Sunstein & Vermeule, 2008) or to purposely harm another group in order to maintain their interests (Hall, 2006).

As some of previous studies (e.g. Chaffee & Kanihan, 1997; Graber, 2002) revealed that mass media are the primary way for people to obtain information about politics, beside others (Norris, 2000; Tewksbury, Weaver, & Maddex, 2001) concluding different effects of news stories on political knowledge.

Some previous research (e.g. Stempel, Hargrove, & Stempel, 2007; Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2004) connected conspiracy theories to media effects, or media gratifications sought (Al-Kandari, 2010). The present study tries, besides the investigating of political news effects on the belief of conspiracy theory, to compare between the roles of traditional and new media in affecting the public's judgment with respect to this matter. With the advent and expansion of Web-based news and its relative flexibility, online news sites encourage users to be highly selective in their consumption of news content provided by editors (Althaus & Tewksbury, 2002, p.182), whereas in print newspapers it is clear what is the most important story so that individuals must actively seek out these stories online (Tewksbury & Althaus, 2000). Although Neuman, Just and Crigler (1992) found that television could be as effective as print media in producing knowledge gain, more recent study (Just et al., 1996) concluded that television news typically includes less coverage and information. Other previous studies (Graber, 1988; Postman, 1985) found that the characteristics of TV enable viewers to understand meanings from both spoken words and the images.

These differences between old and new media lead the present study to test the influence of political news in various media categories on public's adoption of conspiracy theory. According to some of recent studies (Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2004; Sunstein & Vermeule, 2008) conspiracy theories are not only domestic phenomenon

2 Mohamed Al-Shawadfy (2011, December 20). The Military Council: State overthrow scheme includes escalation of events in Al-Tahrir Square and embarrassing us. *Al-Ahram Newspaper*. retrieved from <http://www.gate.ahram.org.eg>

but also can be found all over the world. In my study, I classified the conspiracy view against Egypt in two categories as disseminated in mainstream media: the first category is *foreign conspiracy view* against Egypt in the sense that the troubles and violent events are carried out by foreign powers. The second is the *domestic conspiracy view* against Egypt which refers to the internal powers behind these events. This study is trying to test the effects of exposure to political news in adopting the two kinds of conspiracy belief against Egypt.

## 2. CONSPIRACISM AND THE MANIPULATION WITH TOLERANCE AND AFFECT

Individual conspiracy theories or related counter-normative explanations can seem more or less likely depending on how they comport with other beliefs held by the audience (Wood & Douglas, 2013, p.1). Some of previous studies, although seem to be a starting point to test these relationships, were limited to the finding that beliefs in an un related conspiracy theories tend to inter-correlate (Douglas & Sutton, 2008; Goertzel, 1994; Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic, & Furnham, 2010; Wood et al., 2012); the believes in conspiracy theories would be correlated to how much individuals see authorities as fundamentally deceptive (Simon, Snow, & Read, 2004); how much time the conspiracists spend against official explanation (Simmons & Parsons, 2005; Wood & Douglas, 2013) and positively correlated with mistrust of other people (Goertzel, 1994).

This discussion is voluminous and highly visible in concluding to what extent conspiracists adopt political tolerance towards the parties in conflict actions. Political tolerance was historically defined as a willingness to permit the expression of ideas or interests one opposes” (Sullivan, Pierson, & Marcus, 1982, p.2); willingness to extend the rights of citizenship to all members of the polity—that is to allow political freedoms to those who are different” (Gibson & Bingham, 1982, p.604); extending civil liberties such as freedom of speech and assembly to hate groups and other politically unpopular minorities (Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997, p.569) and is defined as opposition to state actions that limit opportunities for citizens, individually or in groups, to compete for political power (McCabe, 2010, p.12). Tolerance actually develops as a result of one’s exposure to differing viewpoints which leads to different perspectives and allows opposition in a slow process of becoming challenged in one’s ideas (Huckfeldt, Mendez, & Osborn, 2004; McCabe, 2010; Mutz, 2002). Although there are many studies on political tolerance, a few of them (Boyle et al. 2006; Keum et al. 2005; Nelson et al. 1997) researched its relationships to media effects and examined the way in which media framing of civil liberties affected levels of tolerance;

also, McCabe (2010) examined the relationship between selectivity of media content, particularly that of online news, and feelings of political tolerance.

Thus the present study not only tests the influence of the exposure to political news on Egyptian public opinion’s tolerance and feeling towards the parties of violent events (Military Council and the demonstrators) accompanied the demonstrations, but also extends to explore the relationships between the individual conspiracy views and the degrees of both tolerance and feelings. Although some of previous studies defined political tolerance as allowing political freedoms to those who are different (Gibson & Bingham, 1982, p.604) or as the belief that all citizens have the right to express their political views, regardless of how dangerous or repugnant those views (Nie, Junn, & Stehlik-Barry, 1996, p.29) my study is investigating the extent to what respondents are feeling and believing in the right of Egyptian rebels to demonstrate specially when terrible events or violence come from their actions which raised the notion of conspiracy against the country, on the other hand, what will happen in their feeling and thought towards the authority (Military Council) regarding the degrees of adopting the conspiracy view.

## 3. HYPOTHESES

**H1:** Exposure to political news will significantly predict the adoption of both foreign and domestic conspiracy view against Egypt.

**H2:** Exposure to political news will significantly predict tolerance toward both rebels and Military Council.

**H3:** Exposure to political news will significantly predict affect toward both rebels and Military Council.

Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 tested three levels of predictors. The first one was the exposure to news in the main kinds of old and new media (newspapers, TV channels and Internet). The second level included political predictors (talking with other about the issue, political involvement, external and internal political efficacy, political participation and political affiliation) and the third level was some of demographic variables (age, gender, education and income). A linear regression analysis was conducted by using “Enter Model” with conspiracy views, tolerance, and affect indexes as the dependent variables.

**H4:** The adoption of conspiracy view against Egypt will be positively associated with both of tolerance, and affect toward the Military Council and negatively with the rebels.

Pearson’s correlation coefficient was used to test the fourth hypothesis to determine the relationships between variables on this hypothesis, the idea that has not been explicitly tested within these relationships in previous studies. I expected respondents with high levels of adopting conspiracy views against Egypt would be more tolerant and sympathetic to the ruling Military Council and

less to the rebels. Contrary to this were the relationships of respondents embracing conspiracy view in low.

## 4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

To test the hypotheses I conducted a survey analysis using data collected over the population of Cairo and Damietta governorates in Egypt ( $N = 340$ ) in January 2012. This date came two weeks after one of the violent events when the sit-in at the cabinet building was dispersed at dawn on December 16<sup>th</sup> and continued for a week. The questionnaire items included 18 independent variables classified in three levels to test their prediction of the three dependent variables of the study (conspiracy view against Egypt, tolerance, and feelings towards the two parties of the conflict).

### 4.1 Dependent variables

There are three main dependent variables included in the questionnaire as following (See Appendix):

*Conspiracy views:* The questionnaire included a general inquiry about the reasons behind the violence occurred between the rebels and the security forces (whether police or army). Two answers were given to measure how much respondents are adopting *foreign conspiracy view* against Egypt ( $M = 4.35$ ,  $SD = 1.02$ ). Three answers were given to measure how much respondents are adopting *domestic conspiracy view* ( $M = 4.29$ ,  $SD = 0.88$ ).

*Tolerance:* The questionnaire included the tolerance for the two sides of the violent events which erupted through the demonstrations against the ruling military authority. The respondents answered seven items to measure how much they were adopting tolerance for *the tolerance for the Military Council* ( $M = 2.73$ ,  $SD = 0.96$ ). The respondents also answered six items to measure how much they were adopting *The tolerance for the demonstrators* ( $M = 2.70$ ,  $SD = 0.89$ ).

*Affect:* Respondents were asked two questions about how much they feel toward each of the two parties of the conflict (The Military Council and the demonstrators). The feeling thermometer was evolved from the study of Nelson et al. (1997), *the feeling toward The Military Council* ( $M = 5.02$ ,  $SD = 2.35$ ) and *the tolerance toward the demonstrators* ( $M = 6.15$ ,  $SD = 2.18$ ).

### 4.2 Independent Variables

The questionnaire contained the three levels of predictors as shown in the following (See Appendix):

*Exposure to political news:* In order to analyze the impact of exposure to violent events accompanying the demonstrations against the military rule, exposure to the major old and new media (newspapers, television, and the Internet) was categorized according to the degree of using its political news. Respondents were asked questions about the exposure's degree of political news and political

contents during the last month in national (State owned) newspapers ( $M = 1.17$ ,  $SD = 1.04$ ), party newspapers ( $M = 0.59$ ,  $SD = 0.87$ ), private newspapers ( $M = .99$ ,  $SD = 1.09$ ), Egyptian State (official) TV channels ( $M = 2.05$ ,  $SD = 1.17$ ), private TV channels ( $M = 1.86$ ,  $SD = 1.10$ ), Egyptian web news ( $M = 1.12$ ,  $SD = 1.21$ ), Arab and foreign web news ( $M = 0.81$ ,  $SD = .997$ ), and social network websites ( $M = 1.54$ ,  $SD = 1.37$ ).

*Talking with others about the issue:* Respondents were asked four questions about if they were talking about violent events accompanying the demonstrations against The Military Council and security forces with any of their families, friends, colleagues and other people they might meet in public places ( $M = 3.08$ ,  $SD = 0.58$ ).

*Political involvement:* Political involvement has been frequently defined as a stable psychological trait that reveals the perceived relevance of public affairs issues in the political communication literature (Pinkleton, 1999). Political involvement is important to political decision making because it activates individuals' purposeful information search and then involved individuals are active information seekers (Pinkleton & Austin, 2001, 2004). Kushin and Yamamoto (2010, p.610) has shown that the more an issue is perceived relevant and interesting, the greater the need for information, which increases information oriented media use. As individuals are integrated into politics, they develop more active information seeking habits and become less likely to distance themselves from political information (Fu, Mou, Miller, & Jalette, 2011, p.49) to help them in political decision making such as voting and evaluating events and politicians.

The political involvement scale has been used quite extensively in previous research (e.g. Fu et al., 2011; Pinkleton & Austin, 2001). Respondents were asked to answer the extent to which they paid attention and were involved in political events of the following six questions ( $M = 3.41$ ,  $SD = 0.48$ ).

*Political efficacy:* The concept of political efficacy was introduced to political science by Angus Campbell and his colleagues from the Survey Research Centre, University of Michigan in their first U.S. national election survey in 1952 election study, *The Voter Decides* (quoted in Kenski & Stroud, 2006, P.174). They saw that political efficacy refers to a citizen's belief in one's own capacities to take part in and affect the political system or society. Subsequent several scholars have noted that political efficacy has two different dimensions: 1) *Internal efficacy* (the personal sense of efficacy) in which a person's perceptions about the impact he or she may have on the political process come as a result of one's own skills and confidence. 2) *External efficacy* is a more system-oriented sense of efficacy which refers to a person's perceptions of political institutions' responsiveness to citizens' actions in the political process (Coleman, Morrison, & Svennevig, 2008; Kenski & Stroud, 2006; Niemi, Craig, & Mattei,

1991; Schulz, 2005). Many previous studies (e.g. Austin, Van de Vord, Pinkleton, & Epstein, 2008; Cornfield, 2003; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 2003; Jennings & Zeitner, 2003; Lin & Lim, 2002; Norris, 2001) examined political efficacy and its relationships to access to the Internet, or news consumption (e.g. Aarts & Semetko, 2003). Here I try to discover a new area of the relationships between political efficacy and the public adoption of conspiracy theory.

The questionnaire included two items to measure *the internal political efficacy* dimension evolved from previous studies (Schulz, 2005; Tewksbury, Hals, & Bibart, 2008) ( $M = 3.14$ ,  $SD = 1.09$ ), and two items to measure *the external political efficacy* dimension evolved from the studies of Cantijoch, Jorba, San Martin (2008), and Schulz (2005) ( $M = 1.87$ ,  $SD = 0.88$ ).

*Political participation*: was defined as “activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government action—either directly by affecting the making of implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the people’s selection of those policies” (Schulz, 2005; Verba, Schlotzman, & Brady, 1995). The questionnaire included eight activities’ questions which respondents answered if they did the last few months ( $M = 0.68$ ,  $SD = 0.21$ ).

Although some of previous studies (e.g. Moy, Torres, Tanaka, & McCluskey, 2005; Scheufele, 2002) had linked between political participation as dependent variable predicted by traditional media use, and internet use (e.g. Austin et al, 2008; Hardy & Scheufele, 2005; Nisbet & Scheufele, 2004) there is no evidence about political participation as an independent variable to alternatively predict media effects.

*Demographic Items*: The study included a variety of demographic factors; age ( $M = 2.27$ ,  $SD = 0.95$ ), sex ( $M = .45$ ,  $SD = 0.498$ ), education ( $M = 2.003$ ,  $SD = 0.75$ ), income ( $M = 3.17$ ,  $SD = 1.58$ ) and political affiliation ( $M = 0.54$ ,  $SD = 0.499$ ).

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## 5. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS

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Findings in Table 1 show a partial support to the first hypothesis that there was a logistic regression of how some of the three levels predicted the belief in both foreign and domestic conspiracy against Egypt. Reading political news in Egyptian party-owned newspapers, exposure to politics in Egyptian State TV channels, and political affiliation were positive coefficients which predicted the adoption of foreign conspiracy view against Egypt while internal political efficacy was negative significant predictor to this index. Reading political news in private newspapers, access to social network websites, internal political efficacy and education were negative coefficients which predicted the domestic conspiracy view while political affiliation was a positive predictor.

The findings for the first level of analysis illuminate that the more exposure to political news (in Egyptian

party-owned newspapers and official TV channels) at time of violent events that accompanied demonstrations against the Military Council led to more adoption of foreign conspiracy view against Egypt, and the higher exposure to political news in both private newspapers and social network websites led to less domestic conspiracy view.

These findings show that the political content in traditional and online journalism was able to raise the notion of foreign conspiracy against Egypt for respondents and then reduce the domestic conspiracy view of them. Some of previous research (Schleifer, 2005; Vaughan, 2002) probably explain these outcomes by revealing that millions of Arabs strongly believe that America, West and Zionists purposely and continuously scheme to exploit their wealth and conspire to prevent any Arab progress or unity and this conspiracy notion had raised after September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks under the pretext “War on Terror” (e.g. Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2004; Tuckett, 2004) to enable USA and its allies more intervention in the Middle East and Arab affairs. Much of the Arab media reinforce the idea that America supports Israel to engage Arabs in crises, that it schemes to weaken Arab countries by wars to prevent their progress (AL-Kandari, 2010) or the “War on Terror” was in reality a war on Islam (Bunt, 2003; Kellner, 2004; Lantos, 2002). Contrary to these previous studies, AL-Kandari (2010, p.71) concluded that Arab news networks are not the cause of conspiracy theories about America and they might have the opposite effect, because they are leading American officials to talk directly to the Arab masses and to present America as the home of democracy, freedom and human rights that Arab authorities need to follow as a role model in politics. The findings of present study come in contrary to AL-Kandari’s study because she applied her research in different time and circumstances are not experiencing local tensions and violent actions, and also she employed the gratification approach to examine the influence of one category of mass media (Arab news networks) on the belief in conspiracy theories about America.

The internal political efficacy at the second level of predictors negatively influences public’s adoption of both foreign and domestic conspiracy theory against Egypt, and the education at the third level predicted negatively the external conspiracy notion. These results illustrate that respondents with higher confidence in their own political capacities, and those who were more educated had adopted a less conspiracy view against Egypt. Oliver and Wood (2012, p.11) illuminated that if a conspiracist predisposition is magnified by a lack of information or feelings of uncertainty, then “conspiracism” should be more common among the less educated and the less politically informed. Thus, respondents in my study who had limited views and perceptions according to their limited skills and confidence made conclusions on violent events that they did not have a clear understanding about.

**Table 1**  
**OLS Regression of Conspiracy View on Selected Predictors**

Predictors	Adoption of foreign conspiracy theory		Adoption of domestic conspiracy theory	
	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>
Reading news in national newspapers	-1.63*	.058	3.218	.050
Reading news in party newspapers	.133*	.068	1.665	.058
Reading news in private newspapers	-4.07	.056	-.113*	.048
Viewing news in Egyptian State channels	.165***	.050	5.295	.043
Viewing news in private channels	1.582	.053	3.387	.046
Access to Egyptian web news	1.743	.063	-6.006	.054
Access to Arab and foreign web news	2.048	.071	7.749	.061
Access to social network websites	-.104	.057	-9.374*	.049
Talking with others about the issue	9.179	.102	1.518	.087
Political involvement	1.456	.132	.186	.113
External political efficacy	3.843	.063	-5.448	.054
Internal political efficacy	-.145**	.053	-9.550*	.045
Political participation	.503	.293	.323	.252
Political affiliation (Islamic)	.316**	.111	.324***	.095
Age	-2.685	.067	-5.873	.058
Gender (male)	3.252	.118	8.482	.102
Education	-9.058	.075	-.128*	.065
Income	2.485	.037	1.799	.031
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.155		.176	
Adjusted <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.107		.130	
<i>F</i> change	3.261		3.821	
Sig. <i>F</i> change	.000		.000	

Note. *B* is unstandardized regression coefficients, *SE* is standard errors.

\**p* ≤ .06. \*\**p* ≤ .01. \*\*\**p* ≤ .001. *N* = 340

Also at the second level I found that Islamic political affiliation positively predicted the adoption of both foreign and domestic conspiracy view against Egypt. The view of Oliver and Wood (2012) supports my outcome by revealing that individual-level partisanship and ideology play role in identifying conspiracy theory. In Egypt the Islamic parties gained around 75% of the total seats in the parliamentary elections held in the period from November

28<sup>th</sup>, 2011-January 10<sup>th</sup>, 2012<sup>3</sup>. That means respondents who said they voted for Islamic parties, whether favor them or are members at these parties; represent the higher ratio of those who adopted the foreign and domestic conspiracy theory against Egypt.

Table 2 reveals a partial support to the second hypothesis that some elements of the three levels predicted the respondents' tolerance toward the rebels and the Military Council. At the first level of predictors, viewing political news in Egyptian State TV channels was a positive significant predictor of adopting tolerance toward the Military Council and a negative significant predictor of adopting tolerance toward the rebels, while viewing private TV channels was a negative predictor of adopting tolerance toward the Military Council. These contradictory relationships may be due to the fact that the authority is controlling the State channels which are expected to refrain from crossing the red line and remain within the policies of governing authority; in contrast, the private channels tend to function under an anti-government slant, utilizing the freedom that has been more available after 25 January Revolution. In this hypothesis exposure to political news in both Egyptian State and private channels was far superior to reading political news in the three categories of Egyptian newspapers, and this finding is consistent with what previous studies attributed to the mediated and visual appeal of television (Walma van der Molen & Van der Voort, 2000) and its strong impact on the viewers' construction of meaning, and that news workers are drawn to stories which offer powerful images (Cooper, 2000). In addition, newspaper use tends to be significantly less selective than television news use (McCabe, 2010) which leads individuals to be more likely to expose themselves to information that matches personal interest (Althaus & Tewksbury, 2002) and the retention of these information may be stronger from television due to individual interest in certain topics (Neuman et al. 1992).

I did not find online news or social web site variables to predict tolerance. McCabe (2010) illuminated that online news media allows individuals to be highly selective of news content (p.70), and selective exposure only to familiar content can mitigate the potential diversity of ideas and thus limit influences on tolerance (p.3). On the other hand, the theory of affective intelligence argues that when people have a predisposition, they will rely on it when making a judgment and will be less likely to accept new information than people who do not hold a predisposition. (Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, & Stevens, 2005, p.951).

<sup>3</sup> Freedom and Justice Party belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood won the proportion of 46.2% of the total seats in the Egyptian parliament, also the Islamic Salafi Al-Nour Party scooped proportion of 25.1% in addition to the rest of some parties with Islamic background as Al-Wasat Al-Gadid (New Centrist) 2.2%, Al-Asalah (Originality) Party, construction and Development Party 2.2%.

That is why the high access to online news had no effects on respondents' political tolerance judgments.

**Table 2**  
**OLS Regression of Tolerance on Selected Predictors**

Predictors	Tolerance toward the military council		Tolerance toward the rebels	
	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>
Reading news in national newspapers	6.117	.051	-2.645	.049
Reading news in party newspapers	-1.166	.059	-3.392	.057
Reading news in private newspapers	-1.589	.049	4.433	.047
Viewing news in Egyptian State channels	.231***	.044	-.242***	.042
Viewing news in private channels	-.148**	.047	7.769	.045
Access to Egyptian web news	-4.351	.055	5.818	.053
Access to Arab and foreign web news	7.048	.062	-1.666	.060
Access to social network websites	2.991	.050	-5.937	.048
Talking with others about the issue	5.115	.089	-6.746	.086
Political involvement	-3.144	.115	-4.041	.111
External political efficacy	.111*	.055	-4.865	.053
Internal political efficacy	-6.645	.046	8.614*	.044
Political participation	1.269***	.256	-1.103***	.246
Political affiliation (Islamic)	.300**	.097	-.188*	.093
Age	.189**	.059	-2.030	.056
Gender (male)	-.101	.103	4.620	.099
Education	4.103	.066	4.374	.063
Income	-1.542	.032	-5.895*	.031
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.277		.231	
Adjusted <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.237		.188	
<i>F</i> change	6.848		5.35	
Sig. <i>F</i> change	.000		.000	

Note. *B* is unstandardized regression coefficients, *SE* is standard errors.

\**p* ≤ .06. \*\**p* ≤ .01. \*\*\**p* ≤ .001. *N* = 340

At the second level of predictors, the external political efficacy positively predicted respondents' tolerance toward the Military Council while internal efficacy positively predicted the tolerance toward the rebels (Table 2). These outcomes mean that respondents with a higher image and experience of the responsiveness of political system, institutions and actors were more tolerant toward the Military Council, whereas respondents with

a higher confidence of their own political capacity and to act politically were more tolerant toward the rebels. Some of previous studies (Sotelo, 2000; Sullivan et al. 1993) support my findings illuminating that individuals who have political experience and know more about the political systems, government, and other political and civic information are increasingly more tolerant specially toward the authority, and that their trust in government is positively correlated with external efficacy (Niemi et. al., 1991). Yet Sunstein and Vermeule (2008, p.29) see that for people who lack direct or personal information about the explanations for terrible events, they are often tempted to attribute such events to some nefarious actor. Accordingly, they become less tolerant toward heinous or disliked people.

Also at the second level, political participation significantly predicted tolerance positively toward the Military Council and negatively toward the rebels. The positive relationship is consistent with parallel relation between external efficacy and tolerance for the Military Council as shown above, because researchers demonstrated that external efficacy is more likely to be influenced by experiences with political participation than internal efficacy and support the view that confidence in system responsiveness is less stable than confidence in one's own ability to act politically (Schulz, 2005, p.3). Once he feels that he can bring about political change, individually or in concert with others, the person will be more likely to actively involve in politics (Coleman et al. 2008, p.772).

The Islamic political affiliation predicted tolerance positively toward the Military Council and negatively toward the rebels. This finding matches with the above relationship between political participation and tolerance and reveals that respondents who support Islamic parties may be more politically participated and adopt more tolerance toward the ruling Military Council and less tolerant to particular groups who were involved in violence as a result of their escalating activities against the authority. The intolerance of public with Islamic political affiliation toward the rebels probably comes from the fact that the majority of sit-ins and protests accompanied by riots and violence were at the hands of the revolutionary forces of liberalism and Christians-as I pointed out in the introduction, and did not include groups or parties with an Islamic background which focused attention not to collision the Military Council in order to achieve political gains such as the parliamentary majority and winning the presidential election. Moreover Egyptian people had been looking forward to more stability through the transitional phase of ruling Military Council, therefore any groups destabilizing will be undesirable and viewed as against public order. Although findings of some previous studies (e.g. Reimer & Park, 2001; Sullivan et al. 1982) are reflecting this relationship concluding that religion plays

a factor in influencing tolerance these studies meant to examine “religiosity” which was gauged by a variety of measurements, including belonging, behavior and belief (Kellstedt & Corwin, 1993). In my study the effects on tolerance were associated not with the public as adopters of Islamic religion but with public who affiliated or preferred political parties and groups politicizing Islam.

Although the study by Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen, and Russin (2000) indicated that tolerance is most likely cultivated when information is obtained from widely varied networks consisting of mostly tolerant people, I did not find talking with others about the issue to significantly predict tolerance. The reason is that my study focused on social contact for discussion about demonstrations and violent actions and not on general sources of social interaction, that tolerance is more likely to flow from extensive contact with a large and diverse number of people, including both acquaintance and close personal ties (Cigler & Joslyn, 2002; Dovidio, Gaertner, & Kawakami, 2003; Harrell, 2010; Hello, Scheepers, Vermulst, & Gerris, 2004).

At the third level I found two demographic variables which influenced political tolerance, first, age positively predicted respondents’ tolerance toward the Military Council. Contrary to this finding, previous research (e.g. Bobo & Licari, 1989; Owen & Dennis, 1987; Sullivan et al., 1982) found negative relationships between age and tolerance because these studies linked age to education in social contexts that considered adolescents or high school students as more educated than their parents (Owen & Dennis, 1987). Second, the income level negatively predicted tolerance toward the rebels. Peffley & Rohrschneider (2003) found that political tolerance is greater in stable democracies that have endured over time (the longer the better), independent of a nation’s socioeconomic development. In my study this negative relationship is probably due to people with the high income are characterized with more stability in social and economic welfare which is threatened by demonstrations, sit-ins and protests caused by the rebels (who became a disliked group) in this period which witnessed a decline in economic performance in the country.

I did not find significant relationships between the two kinds of tolerance and both of gender and education. Sullivan et al. (1982) argue that education is less important than previously reported in other studies, while recently, Gaasholt and Togeby (1995) demonstrated that cognitive constraint is high also in the minority among people lacking in academic education that scores high on tolerance. On the contrary, Bobo and Licari (1989) found strong positive effects of education on a multiple target group tolerance scale. The present study is different in its findings from previous studies because they linked the influence of education with other variables such as social class, ethnic and religious groups or political affiliation.

Golebiowska (1999) found that although gender differences in tolerance have not been large but have been persisting since the beginning of systematic research on the subject in 1950s, women are more reluctant than men to allow unpopular groups to exercise their constitutional rights, while Sullivan et al. (1982) found that women and men select different disliked groups, noting that women tend to pick nonreligious groups as their least-liked. However, no differences between men and women were reported (Sullivan, et al., 1982). No gender differences were found in the present study contrary to the findings of Golebiowska in which she measured tolerance toward the disliked social groups such as atheist, racists, homosexuality or militarists and their acceptance socially.

**Table 3**  
**OLS Regression of Affect on Selected Predictors**

Predictors	Feelings toward the Military Council		Feelings toward the rebels	
	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>
Reading news in national newspapers	.106	.128	8.526	.126
Reading news in party newspapers	.156	.150	8.702	.148
Reading news in private newspapers	-.174	.124	.157	.122
Viewing news in Egyptian State channels	.520***	.111	-.270*	.109
Viewing news in private channels	-.257*	.118	9.324	.116
Access to Egyptian web news	-8.018	.139	-1.808	.137
Access to Arab and foreign web news	.147	.158	4.839	.155
Access to social network websites	-9.795	.126	-7.386	.124
Talking with others about the issue	.278	.225	.194	.222
Political involvement	5.293	.292	.240	.287
External political efficacy	.232	.138	-.328*	.136
Internal political efficacy	-.363*	.117	.113	.115
Political participation	2.198**	.648	-2.201***	.636
Political affiliation (Islamic)	.476*	.245	.177	.241
Age	382**	.148	-.237	.146

To be continued



Continued

Predictors	Feelings toward the Military Council		Feelings toward the rebels	
	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>
Gender (male)	-.221	.261	.119	.258
Education	4.007	.166	-8.598	.164
Income	-1.858	.081	-7.202	.079
$R^2$	.229		.133	
Adjusted $R^2$	.186		.085	
<i>F</i> change	5.31		2.744	
Sig. <i>F</i> change	.000		.000	

Note. *B* is unstandardized regression coefficients, *SE* is standard errors (*SE*).

\* $p \leq .06$ . \*\* $p \leq .01$ . \*\*\* $p \leq .001$

I found partial support to the third hypothesis related to the three levels of predictors on respondents feelings toward the two parties of the violent actions (Table 3). For the first level, viewing political news in Egyptian State TV channels was a positive significant predictor of respondents feeling toward the Military Council and a negative significant predictor of their feeling toward the rebels, while viewing private TV channels was a negative predictor of feelings toward the Military Council. These relationships are largely in line with what has been reached in the second hypothesis related to the effects of these indicators at the first level, that positive effect of viewing political news in Egyptian TV channels on tolerance toward the authority led to positive feelings to it, and its negative effect on tolerance toward the rebels created negative feelings to them, also the negative effect of viewing political news in private TV channels on tolerance toward the authority created negative feelings to it. The “hot cognition” assumption which had been reached by previous research (e.g. Lodge & Taber, 2000, 2005; Lodge, Steenbergen, & Brau, 1995) clears my findings that all sociopolitical concepts that have been evaluated in the past are affectively charged, and this affect will bring automaticity toward political leaders, groups, and issues.

At the second level, although the second hypothesis showed significant positive effects of external political efficacy on tolerance toward the Military Council and no significant effects were obvious on tolerance toward the rebels (review Table 2); the external efficacy significantly predicted negative feeling toward the rebels as shown in Table 3.

Also in spite that the second hypothesis illuminated significant positive effects of internal political efficacy on tolerance toward the rebels and no significant effects were

found on tolerance toward the Military Council (Table 2), the internal efficacy negatively predicted feeling toward the Military Council (Table 3). These findings reveal that the positive feeling toward one of the parties of the conflict leads to a lack of tolerance toward the other party, and vice versa. Lodge and Taber (2005) explicate this phenomena through the process of “evaluative integration” in which citizens may store and rely on more and different types of considerations when evaluating groups or issues. If so, they cannot depend on a simple affective linkage in memory, but will sample a fuller set of considerations that have been stored in memory about the object and then and there construct an evaluation from an integration of these considerations. (p.457) Then the positive or negative feelings toward the groups or politicians not necessarily bring all positive or negative evaluations of them; in addition, the positive evaluation of one party may negatively affect emotions toward counterparts in the conflict process.

The political activity significantly predicted feeling positively toward the Council and negatively toward the rebels; also Islamic political affiliation significantly predicted positive feeling toward the Council. These findings in hypothesis 3 also match to a large extent with findings in the second hypothesis with respect to those variables. At the third level, age was the only positive significant predictor of feeling toward the Military Council and also comes consistent with its effects on tolerance toward the authority.

In the first three hypotheses there were no effects of both of talking with others about the issue, and political involvement. Scheufele (2002) suggested that citizens’ understanding of politics may depend on an interactive effect of mass and interpersonal communication. That is, people who engage in interpersonal discussion with others about what they have read or heard in mass media will have disproportionately higher levels of understanding than people who engage in political discussions with others less frequently (p.49). Then people with less discussions about the issue will be vulnerable to the content of the mass media more than those who do not rely on the extensive use of them. On the other hand, people with a higher level of political involvement have a greater need for information about issue which is perceived relevant and interesting (Chew, 1994; Kushin & Yamamoto, 2010) and they will gain more knowledge about the issue and become aware of it more than uninvolved people who will be more influenced by various information sources.

Table 4 shows strong support to the fourth hypothesis that both of foreign and domestic conspiracy view against Egypt was significantly associated positively with tolerance toward the Military Council and negatively with the rebels.

**Table 4**  
**Correlations Between Conspiracy and Both of Tolerance and Affect**

Variables	Foreign conspiracy view	Domestic conspiracy view
Tolerance toward the Military Council	.33**	.13*
Tolerance toward the rebels	-.39**	-.17**
Feelings toward the Military Council	.34**	.11*
Feelings toward the rebels	-.24**	-.029

Note. Sig. (2-tailed) \*  $p \leq .06$ . \*\*  $p \leq .01$ . N= 340

This raising thought of conspiratorial thinking, specifically in time of local violent events caused by the rebels, led the public to adopt more negative feelings and less tolerant attitude toward them and to develop positive feelings and more tolerance toward the authority. The violent actions and clashes with security forces which accompanied rebels' demonstrations and sit-ins in the present study may cause "anxiety" discussed by Marcus et al. (2005) through the theory of "affective intelligence" revealing that this anxiety caused by the actions of the disliked group decreases tolerance toward them (p.953). On the other hand the "motivated reasoning approach" interprets my findings that all notions and beliefs whether positive or negative toward the politicians or social groups have its affect-laden or so called "hot cognition" and this affective charge becomes directly linked to the concepts in long-term memory through on-line (OL) tally (Fazio, 2001; Lodge & Taber, 2000, 2005). The respondents' intolerance toward the rebels was due to their negative evaluations and beliefs that had been charged with negative emotions, the same that applied to the linkage between positive evaluations and affective charge toward the Military Council resulting in more tolerance.

## CONCLUSION

My findings regarding exposure to political news accompanying violent demonstrations suggest the ability of exposure to political news to affect public's adoption of conspiracy view against Egypt. Reading political news in Egyptian party newspapers and viewing politics in state TV channels affected the public to embrace more of foreign conspiracy view against Egypt, while reading political news in Egyptian private newspapers and access to social network websites affected the public to adopt less of domestic conspiracy view even in the case of the outbreak of internal disturbances and violence caused by internal groups, political activists and demonstrators in the wake of January 25<sup>th</sup> revolution in 2011. The public with higher internal political efficacy and education were less in their adopting of foreign and domestic conspiracy

view against Egypt, while the public with higher Islamic political affiliation have been more in adopting both kinds of conspiracy view.

I found that the state and private satellite channels have had the sole effect without all of newspapers and online journalism to affect public's tolerance and affect. These findings reveal the success of official visual media to influence the public judgments and feelings toward the authority positively and, in contrast, were the private channels that do not fall under the ruling power. The outcomes of the present study demonstrate that both external and internal political efficacy, political participation, Islamic political affiliation, age and income status are equal in their significant effects positively on public's tolerance and feelings toward the authority and negatively toward other social groups in violent actions. These findings mean that the public in Egypt is less tolerant and sympathetic toward activists and political groups who cause terrible or violent actions even if related to their right for speech or legitimate demands in a difficult period which witnessed instability in economic and domestic security.

The present study suggests the linkage between tolerance attitude and feelings toward the two parties of the violent actions goes through the process of "evaluative integration" which led to the evaluation of one of the parties adversely consisting of emotion to the other party in the conflict process, or the higher level of tolerance toward one party would be associated to more positive feelings to it, while intolerance would be associated to more negative feelings toward the same party. This "directional goals" process (Lodge & Taber, 2005; Morris, Squires, Taber, & Lodge, 2003) which is used by the respondents in my study construes that they were bias when calling assessments and tolerant attitudes from the long-term memory and automatically these directional goals fetch all emotional and semantic content related to these assessments. My findings also suggest that the respondents not only directed their tolerant attitudes and emotions toward the two parties of the conflict, but also had the priority to link their negative feelings and intolerance toward the rebels to the adoption of conspiracy view against Egypt and to link their positive feelings and more tolerance toward the Military Council.

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## APPENDIX

Variables	Items	Scales
<b><i>Reading political news and contents in newspapers (national, party and private newspapers)</i></b>	<p>1- During the last month were you reading the politics in newspapers or magazines?</p> <p>2- How many times per the week were you reading domestic political news and other political contents in every one of the three categories of Egyptian journals (national, party, and private newspapers)? (respondents answered for each one of newspapers and magazines' categories).</p> <p>3- How many hours per each time were you reading political news and other political contents? (respondents answered for each one of newspapers and magazines' categories).</p> <p>* The total of three questions' answers were computed to calculate arithmetic mean of this variable, that reading's degree of political contents in each kind of Egyptian newspapers (national, party, and private) were computed in four degrees.</p>	<p>1- 0 = Never; 1 = Few; 2 = Sometimes; 3 = always</p> <p>2- 0 = Never; 1 = less than one day a week; 2 = 1-2 days a week; 3 = 3-5 days a week; 4 = every day</p> <p>3- 0 = never; 1 = less than ½ hour; 2 = ½ - 1 hour; 3 = 1-2 hours; 4= more than 2 hours</p> <p>* 0 = Non; 1 = Low; 2 = Medium; 3 = High</p>
<b><i>Exposure to political news and programs in TV (official Egyptian and private channels)</i></b>	<p>1- During the last month were you viewing the politics in TV channels (one question for Egyptian State TV Channels and other for private)?</p> <p>2- How many times per the week were you viewing domestic political news and other political programs in every one of the two categories of TV channels (Egyptian State, and private channels)? (respondents answered for each one of channels).</p> <p>3- How many hours per each time were you viewing political news and programs? (respondents answered for each one of channels' categories).</p> <p>* The total of three questions' answers were computed to calculate arithmetic mean of this variable, that exposure's degree of news and political contents in each kind of Egyptian State and private TV channels were computed in four degrees.</p>	<p>1- 0 = Never; 1 = Few; 2 = Sometimes; 3 = always</p> <p>2- 0 = Never; 1 = less than one day a week; 2 = 1-2 days a week; 3 = 3-5 days a week; 4 = every day</p> <p>3- 0 = never; 1 = less than ½ hour; 2 = ½ - 1 hour; 3 = 1-2 hours; 4 = more than 2 hours</p> <p>* 0 = Non; 1 = Low; 2 = Medium; 3 = High</p>
<b><i>Access to political news in the web</i></b>	<p>1- During the last month were you accessing the online news, blogs, or social network websites ?</p> <p>2- How many times per the week were you accessing domestic political news and other political contents in every one of the categories of the web (Egyptian web, Arab web, social network websites)? (respondents answered for each one of the web sites).</p> <p>3- How many hours per each time were you accessing political news and political contents? (respondents answered for each one of the web's categories).</p> <p>* The total of three questions' answers were computed to calculate arithmetic mean of this variable, that the degree of access to news and political contents in each kind of the web (Egyptian web, Arab web, and social networks websites) were computed in four degrees.</p>	<p>1- 0 = Never; 1 = Few; 2 = Sometimes; 3 = always</p> <p>2- 0 = Never; 1= less than one day a week; 2 = 1-2 days a week; 3 = 3-5 days a week; 4 = every day</p> <p>3- 0 = never; 1 = less than ½ hour; 2 = ½ - 1 hour; 3 = 1-2 hours; 4 = more than 2 hours</p> <p>* 0 = Non; 1 = Low; 2 = Medium; 3 = High</p>
<b><i>Talking with others about the issue</i></b>	<p>Talking about the issue with other people; family, friends, colleagues at work, or with people in public places.</p> <p>The total of four questions' answers were computed to calculate arithmetic mean of this variable.</p>	<p>1 = Never; 2 = Few; 3 = Sometimes; 4 = Always</p>
<b><i>Political involvement in media</i></b>	<p>1- I paid attention to parliamentary election in mass media.</p> <p>2- I paid attention to government's formation and activities.</p> <p>3- I paid attention to decisions and activities of the Military Council in mass media.</p> <p>4- When I see or read news about elections or candidates I try to know how much it is bias.</p> <p>5- When I see or read political news I try to know what is going around it.</p> <p>6- News about political candidates or people in government drive me to ask how they can change things.</p>	<p>0 = Never; 1 = Few; 2 = Sometimes; 3 = Always</p>

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Variables	Items	Scales
<b>Internal political efficacy</b>	1- Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on. 2- I think that I know less about politics and government than most other people.	Both internal and external political efficacy items were reversed and coded: 1 = Agree strongly; 2 = Agree somewhat; 3 = Neither agree nor disagree; 4 = Disagree somewhat; 5 = Disagree strongly
<b>External political efficacy</b>	1- The government (people in government) does/do not care a lot about what all of us think. 2- Politicians are always in search of their personal interest.	
<b>Political participation</b>	1- Membership in parties. 2- voting in elections and referendums. 3- protest activities. 4- membership in one of civil institutions. 5- membership in one of 25 January Revolution's coalitions. 6- participation in political and social conferences. 7- communication with media to express own views. 8- participation in strikes.	0 = No; 1 = yes
<b>External conspiracy notion against Egypt</b>	1- There have been attempts by some external actors to create a rift between the people and the army. 2- There are elements trying to take advantage of the blood of the martyrs of the revolution and implement an international plan to destabilize the status quo in Egypt.	1 = Disagree strongly; 2 = Disagree somewhat; 3 = Neither agree nor disagree; 4 = Agree somewhat; 5 = Agree strongly
<b>Internal conspiracy notion against Egypt</b>	1- An attempt led by Internal parties to disrupt the parliamentary elections and drag the country into chaos. 2- Attempts by remnants and followers of the Mubarak regime and his family to avenge the Egyptian people. 3- Hidden hands trying to destabilize the Egyptian national security and corrupt the purity of the country.	
<b>Tolerance for the Military Council</b>	1- Army troops have the right to direct weapons against demonstrators to defend itself or state facilities. 2- The Military Council running the country in the same way of the regime of former President Mubarak. 3- Dragging a young woman along the ground and baring her torso in the Al-Tahrir Square is a personal mistake by Egyptian army soldiers and not to be charged by the Military Council. 4- The Military Council exhausted the balance of confidence with the Egyptian people as the executive to manage the affairs of the state. 5- The Military Council proceeded to create stability in Egypt through the management of the affairs of the country (the country's affairs management). 6- The nature of the events reveals the Military Council's losing his legitimacy On which its leaders build their management of the transitional period. 7- The Military Council bears the burden of what is happening because he did not give a serious investigation In order to detect the perpetrators of the previous massacres.	Items numbers 1,3,5 were coded: 1 = Disagree strongly; 2 = Disagree somewhat; 3 = Neither agree nor disagree; 4 = Agree somewhat; 5 = Agree strongly  Items numbers 2,4,6,7 were reversed and coded: 1 = Agree strongly; 2 = Agree somewhat; 3 = Neither agree nor disagree; 4 = Disagree somewhat; 5 = Disagree strongly

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Variables	Items	Scales
<b>Tolerance for the demonstrators</b>	1- The actions of the rebels against the army and the police abused the 25 January Revolution. 2- Sit-ins and demonstrations are necessary to complete the revolution goals. 3- Rebels' behaviors gave the opportunity to the thugs in order to bring more violence. 4- The young men rebels deserve to feel sympathize with them and fend any attacks on them. 5- There are more opportunities for the bloodshed because of the folly of some of the protesters. 6- Burning and destructing facilities is sufficient justification for the use of violence against demonstrators.	Items numbers 2,4 were coded: 1 = Disagree strongly; 2 = Disagree somewhat; 3 = Neither agree nor disagree; 4 = Agree somewhat; 5 = Agree strongly Items numbers 1,3,5,6 were reversed and coded: 1 = Agree strongly; 2 = Agree somewhat; 3= Neither agree nor disagree; 4 = Disagree somewhat; 5 = Disagree strongly
<b>Feelings towards The Military Council</b>	1- How much sympathetic do you feel toward The Military Council? 2- How much enthusiastic do u feel toward The Military Council?.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Not Strongly sympathetic sympathetic
<b>Feelings thermometer towards the demonstrators</b>	1- How much sympathetic do you feel toward the demonstrators? 2- How much enthusiastic do u feel toward the demonstrators?.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Not Strongly enthusiastic enthusiastic  The higher number is for more sympathy or enthusiasm you feel. The lower number is for less feeling. You will give 5 rating if your feeling is neutral.
<b>Gender (male)</b>	male female	1 = male 0 =female
<b>Age</b>	18-more than 50 years old	1 = 18-25 2 = 26-39 3 = 40-50 4 = more than 50
<b>Education</b>		1 = High school or less 2 = University degree 3 = Advanced studies 4 = Master or PHD degree
<b>Income</b>	Respondents were asked to mention the total income by Egyptian pound for the family per month	1 = 700 or less 2 = 700-1,500 3 = 1,500-2,500 4 = 2,500-4,000 5 = 4,000-6,000 6 = more than 6,000
<b>Political affiliation (Islamist)</b>	Respondents were asked to choose one of the candidates or political parties which they voted for, or they may favor: liberals, Islamists, Leftists, independent or do not care.	1 = Islamism 0 = other variables