

## Religious Influence of Boko-Haram and Governance Challenges in Handling Internal Displaced Citizens in Nigeria

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### Abstract

The prevalence of religious sacrilege is attributed to a lack of comprehension regarding the inherent separation between religion and government. This study explores the intricate relationship between the religious influence of Boko Haram, a notorious extremist group in Nigeria. This study examined the influence of Boko-Haram and governance in the management of internally displaced persons in the Northeast region, specifically Borno and Yobe in Nigeria. Methodologically, content and narrative analysis are used to analyse the study objective. Conflict Management theory is adopted for the underpinning of the study. The findings suggest that religious individuals and groups have disrupted the established societal roles and norms of citizens, thereby undermining the legitimacy of constitutional principles. Hence, the study concludes that religious actors and followers have desecrated constitutional legitimacy, consequently affecting citizens. Therefore, governance has been confronted with administrative fiasco in its handling of the affected citizens in the study area.

**Key words:** Boko haram; Displacement; Governance; Religion. religious influence

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### 1. INTRODUCTION

When the British arrived in Northern Nigeria in 1902-1903, they were met with a noticeable division from the South. There is limited evidence of the influence of the modern world in that area, and the Christian population there faced challenges in integrating into society and participating in social and public matters. Acknowledging the considerable religious influence wielded by local rulers, Britain implemented a governance strategy called indirect rule, which enabled the administrative framework of the Fulani Empire to endure. During the colonial period, Sharia law was the officially recognised legal system. After Nigeria gained independence in 1960, the North's isolation and lack of educated individuals from that region led to a situation where most official positions were held by Southerners, especially those of Igbo origin. The ascent of the Christian South to power sparked apprehension among the northern aristocracy, who harboured concerns about the potential jeopardy of the North's cherished and profoundly conservative way of life. This fear laid the groundwork for the following conflicts between different religions. In the late 1970s, religious conflicts reached a boiling point and took on different forms, including the Izala Movement, Maitastine Movement (which led to infamous and violent riots in Kano), the Muslim Brothers, the Islamic Movement of Nigeria, and Muhajirun, as noted by Paden (2015). Umar (207) highlights the repetitive nature of these groups, which can be seen as early iterations of Boko Haram. It is important to recognise that, in addition to their religious beliefs, they also capitalised on broader socio-economic grievances, feelings of political marginalisation, and widespread criticism of the government (seen as corrupt) and local Islamic leaders (accused of straying from authentic Islamic values) to mobilise people and attract followers.

Boko Haram is not Northern Nigeria's first extremist Islamic movement, first appeared in the early 19th century when Islam in the area was dominated by the Sokoto

Caliphate and Northern Nigerian groups (Ushe, 2015). They described themselves as enforcers of the strict Islamic law and opposed foreign influence; these groups are also motivated by social and economic problems. Between 1999 and 2001, 12 northern states adopted Sharia law (Dowd, 2016). However, several people in the north started calling for the adoption of Sharia law across the country. This sentiment, together with the growing socio-economic inequality gave rise to what became known as the Nigerian Taliban in 2002, led by the charismatic preacher, Mohammad Yusuf.

Furthermore, Africa, especially sub-Saharan is known for its religious commitment, and while religion may not be formally part of Nigeria's government, it has an impact on the country's policies (Ushe, 2015). Religion's influence on Nigerian governance is one of many fundamental issues that have received little attention in third-world countries. In any case, politicians who have recently recognized religion and its affiliations as a formal sector of state governance have paid close attention to the debate in the purview of literature exercises. More importantly, citizens are an important part of governance, but they also serve as a road map for how those roles are defined (Fukuyama, 2019). The formalization of religion as a state pattern in Nigeria's cosmetology of governance was made possible in large part by the participation and recognition of religious institutions. In the northeast, there is a bias against non-religious people because of the region's strong religious convictions. Since the implications of this have been established as state concerns, the state constitution serves as the primary source of documentation. Democratic government is one of the main functions of the state. In affirming the religious foothold in governance, the Constitution, a unified pinnacle of governance is referred to as helping the ecosystem of governance toward national growth (Wabi et al., 2022). Although many democratic norms are enshrined in the constitutions of third-world countries, allowing progress and nation-building to flourish (Bebbington et al., 2018). Inadvertently, the study shows that the influence of religious practices has undermined security, fundamental human rights, representation for all, the rule of law, power separation and power checks, and democratic dispensations, which are essentials in a functioning political system that has continued to move into oblivion.

There are claims that the democratic ideals of leadership are influenced by constitutional limits, including administrative and corporate governance (Agbibo, 2013). As a result, citizens across Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in Nigeria's northeast, are growing increasingly dissatisfied (Shchukina et al., 2018). This means that constraints placed on the constitution have had the opposite effect. In recent developments, poor governance from ineffective leadership largely created a serious challenge in ensuring the rights and privileges of persons are protected (Tajudeen and Adebayo, 2013). Be that as it may, human rights abuses have increased because

of conflicts resulting in mass displacement (Ottuh and Omosor, 2022). Even when civil rule is restored, religious rituals have corrupted governance and make it impossible for civil rule to return to a normal situation (Afolabi, 2016). As a result, the incessant fall in fragility, that is, social and political factors in Nigeria brewed the Boko Haram, banditry, kidnapping, and abduction insurgency have arisen (Jegede, 2019). Without a doubt, many residents in the state's northeast region were illiterate about electoral principles and forced to flee their homes. It is on this premise that this paper investigates the impact of conflict and displaced voters on governance in the northeastern region of Nigeria. Thus, consideration was given to how long-term displacement would affect various stakeholders before, during, and following the election process. The study indicates that government, international organizations, and private institutions are all urged to do more to stop the Boko Haram-caused exodus of citizens. International organisations have great roles to play in helping to manage conflict and keep peace in developing countries (Chukwudi, Osimen, Dele-Dada, & Ahmed, (2024)

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## **2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF INSURGENCY OPERATIONS AND INTERNALLY DISPLACEMENT PERSONS IN NORTHEAST**

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From the chronicles of conflict phenomenon, the displacement of Nigerians during the conflict-of-events in Nigeria's north-eastern region has had a devastating effect on democratic governance principles in that country (Salleh et al., 2018). Nonetheless, this region includes Bauchi, Taraba, Gombe, Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa (Kamta et al., 2020). Conflict-related events, such as brutal murders and acts of terrorism carried out by gangs, have become all too common in the area (Nnadi et al., 2020). These actions have left the region's electorates traumatized and unsteady. The trauma and instability experienced by the North-East electorate have impacted individual lives and opportunities for civic engagement considering the preceding (Raji et al., 2021). To fulfill their religious indoctrination responsibilities, the insurgency of the region has prevented many electorates from entering the political arena. Because of the ongoing conflict in the region, good governance cannot be passed down to future generations. However, (Itumo and Nwefuru, 2016) despite Boko Haram's existential consequences in the north-east, their primary focus on Western education has depleted the fundamentals of productive governance in Nigeria. Considering the foregoing, this study reveals that it is common for a variety of interests to rely on their ability to function while simultaneously denying the interests of others because conflict is a constant factor in the environment.

By the same token, Boko Haram’s ideology and the goals of the government have always conflicted (Gbigbiddje et al., 2020). There is a tension between global interests and the interests of a particular religious sect. Umar et al. (2018) found that an anti-good governance syndicate will be unable to intimidate or harass citizens if they are operating in an environment where citizens have full rights to existence and means of subsistence, as was the case previously (Boko Haram, Banditry, Kidnappers, and abductors). The later context of interest that determines the selection of good governance from the preceding has resulted in tribalization and destabilization of the environmental stability that governance ensures (Adamu and Rasheed, 2016). Because of this, this paper investigates how organized crime groups affect elections in the country’s northeastern region.

Politically, Salleh et al. (2018) opined that the insurgency and the response to it have been devastating. Domestically, Abbani (2021) the COIN campaign had become a poisonous political issue, often used by rival parties to undermine one another. This was particularly clear during the most recent administration campaign. Regionally, Shehu and Abba (2020) posit that over the years Nigeria and its immediate neighbours have criticized one another for their inability to stem the Boko Haram problem. Internationally, Wabi, Daniel, and Adubakar (2022) Nigeria’s foreign relations and, particularly military exchanges (in terms of weapon transfers, training, and funding) with Washington and London had oftentimes been put on hold because of human rights abuses perpetrated by Nigerian forces.


## 2.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT

Numerous studies (Ugwu, Iwuagwu, Onah, Nnadi, Kalu, Ugwuanyi, and Ibenwa, 2023) have previously examined the governance challenges and prevalence of religious bigotry across different subjects on a global scale. This topic extends beyond the realms of practice, literature, or theory, but it has undergone rigorous academic

examination on the socioeconomic and health assessment of IDPs Suleiman (2023). Furthermore, it is important to note that research by Okon (2018) in the study found that there has been conducted on the impact of Boko Haram on development, community reconstruction, and the (Wabi et al., 2022; Onoja et al., 2020; Ekoh et al., 2021) rehabilitation of internally displaced persons (IDPs). However, it is crucial to acknowledge that these studies have not thoroughly analysed the role of religious factors in the insurgency’s influence on governance within the region in the context of academic rigour. It is on this premise that this study aims to address the existing gaps in Northeast Nigeria, which are a result of the religious influence of Boko Haram and the challenges faced by the government in handling internally displaced persons.

## 2.2 METHODOLOGY

The research employed a qualitative methodology. The researcher purposefully opted for secondary data to obtain a deeper understanding of the influence of Boko Haram’s religious ideology and governance challenges on the administration of internally displaced persons in Northeast Nigeria. Furthermore, a diverse range of secondary sources, encompassing articles, journals, documents, and internet sources, were employed. Furthermore, a range of scholarly databases including Google Scholar, JSTOR, Science Direct, and Web of Science were consulted, with no differentiation made between British and American English. The user’s text centers on the examination of search protocols about the subjects of “Religion and Boko-Haram” and “Governance challenges” within the framework of overseeing Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the Northeastern region of Nigeria. The text also discusses the ramifications of Boko Haram’s religious influence on governance within the study area, as well as the factors that need to be taken into account when addressing the issues faced by internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the region. The application of content and narrative techniques played a pivotal role in the examination of the data.



**Figure 1**  
**Literature Search Protocol**  
Source: Author’s search result compilation, 2023

### 3. LITERATURE REVIEW AND FINDINGS

#### 3.1 An Examination of the Religious Phenomenon and Insurgency Conception

As previously stated, religion exerts a substantial influence on governance, extending beyond formal state institutions. Since achieving independence, Nigeria has experienced the emergence of religious and tribal influences that have had a substantial impact on its political sphere (Unai, 2016). The scholar's findings imply that the transition program emphasises the correlation between pledges of loyalty and religious fervour that exist within the spectrum of governance. Against this background, before the advent of the colonial masters, religious belief observed within the framework of the traditional governance structure was traditional, which was accompanied by the selection and assignment of officials in southwestern Nigeria. In order words, in the purview of northern Nigeria, Tomba (2019) found that the theocratic system of rulership recognises Islam as a core religious principle. This doctrine largely underscores that Western education is a bane of Islamic doctrines. The efficacy of this approach in enhancing governance is widely acknowledged, despite encountering obstacles from political incumbents. Albeit a manifestation of tribalism within Nigerian society, it underscores the significance of interconnectivity within the religious framework of the nation. Specifically, Sufianu's (2022) analysis examines that individual within this collective possesses a distinct religious orientation. Helfont (2018) pointed out that the prevailing misconceptions of this awareness particularly posit that the Hausa and Yoruba ethnic groups are predominantly affiliated with the Islamic faith, whereas the Igbo population is primarily composed of Christians and adherents of diverse indigenous religions within Nigeria.

#### 3.2 Boko Haram Belief discourse and IDPs consequences

In tandem with the preceding text, (Ewa, 2018) discovered that despite its existence beyond formal state institutions, religion, as previously indicated in each behavioural pattern exerts a substantial influence on governance. Due to traditions, Jacob et al. (2016) observe that culture, belief, propaganda, sect, and customs since independence contributed to the emergence of religious and tribal influences that have come to shape its political landscape. Often, study reveals that the nexus of group reactions to transition programs elucidates oaths of allegiance that are predicated on religious devotion by devotees oftentimes extremist (Agbaje, 2020). Amid religious beliefs and existential debate, extremists in the study area disabuse their subject mindset against the deriving benefits of Western culture, especially Western education. Considering the, Balogun (2020) observes that there is a consensus of thoughts that realms of dynamic paraded among the preponderance of the northern hemisphere

trigger the interplay of Boko-Haram belief. Similarly, Adesote and Ajayi (2021) state that the manifestation of the Boko-Haram religion has continued to be a compelling illustration of brainwashed mechanisms for attackers in targeted locations. However, Adewale (2016) argued before the studies that Boko Haram its viewpoint put up attacking religious gatherings particularly churches to register its intentions to every extant Western foothold in the region. Based on the prevailing misconceptions, Liman and Muhammad (2020) uphold that it is commonly believed that the Hausa the reinforcement of Boko-Haram belief religiously left various arguments stranded as it extended the attacks on mosques and other social gatherings.

#### 3.3 Boko Haram Insurgency and Displaced Persons

The previous account (Amala, 2015; Omole et al., 2015; Emmanuellar, 2015; Itumo and Nwefuru, 2016) highlights the executed attacks of the mentioned group, focusing on the Boko Haram insurgency and the resulting displacement of individuals. According to reports, the establishment and leadership of the Boko Haram sect is attributed to Muhammad Yusuf, who is known for his opposition to elements of civilization and Western education in the region. The spread of Boko Haram's influence in the region has resulted in the widespread adoption of extremist ideologies, like the way a hydra grows multiple heads. The death of a Boko Haram leader can be interpreted as a significant symbol of the ongoing migration in the region, particularly in Borno where the group has established its operational base. Research has shown that Boko Haram strategically expanded its presence by incorporating Yobe state, in addition to its original birthplace in 2004. During that period, Muhammad Yusuf implemented name changes for various communities to symbolise the connection between the sect and Islam. In addition, Adeniyi (2011) reported that a town in Yobe State underwent a name change and is now referred to as Kanamma, which shows occupants of those areas ran for safety. Therefore, the study note that the mentioned sect's radical Islamic theology is characterised by a clear objective, which has motivated internally displaced persons in the area.

Although prevailing belief among a significant number of Islam faithful is that Islam espouses principles of serenity and concord (Yahya, 2004). However, Hughes (1985) argued that certain extremists within the Islamic faith have misleadingly indoctrinated their followers with a fabricated notion of being rewarded with fifty virgins upon engaging in acts of violence in the name of Allah. Thus, extremists who are recruited as extremists often unquestioningly embrace the notion of sacrificing their lives for the sake of Allah, without critically examining why the proponents of such ideology themselves do not engage in acts of self-bombing. How do these leaders

comprehend the principles underlying the allocation of virgins in Al Jannah? In response to the inquiries raised within this study, there is a notable increase in the utilisation of targeted strategies such as killings, suicide bombings, widespread kidnapping, and looting. Furthermore, rural communities and other settlements have been observed to migrate from conflict zones to seek refuge in safer havens. According to the authors, the current matter under consideration involves the assertion that the belief system of Boko Haram has posed a challenge to good governance and the mismanagement of internally displaced individuals.

Despite Boko Haram's primary notion of attaining political power by infiltrating the civilian government, its religious underpinnings remain a significant catalyst for the ongoing displacement of individuals away from their place of birth. Before this according to Letswa and Isyaku (2018), the leader of Boko Haram in Nigeria has been linked to perspectives on governance that have given rise to a range of challenges, including corruption, unemployment, poverty, and the stifling of authentic Islamic practices. Furthermore, Mohammed (2020) asserts that Abubakar Shekau, the resurgent leader of Boko Haram, is widely recognised as a substantial menace to the security of the Northeast region. Based on data from the Nigeria Security Tracker (NST) in the year 2014, it was observed that Boko Haram underwent a process of reorganisation and executed a substantial series of assaults within the time frame spanning from 2009 to 2014 after the founder's demise. In light of the aforementioned attacks encompassing bombings, armed assaults, kidnappings, abductions, and the deliberate destruction of communities via arson. So, Mohammed's (2020) findings validate the current insurgency conflict in the region as well as result in a documented fatality count exceeding 23,000 individuals.

### **3.4 Governance contests and Internally Displaced Persons Management**

According to the National Emergency Management Agency's estimation in 2015, the attacks by Boko Haram in northern Nigeria resulted in the displacement of over 2.5 million individuals from their homes (Olawajuwaju et al., 2018). Out of the total number mentioned, approximately 1.2 million individuals have been compelled to depart from their country of origin. To effectively engage the IDP's data control, the distribution of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Nigeria was approximately equal between men and women, with each gender comprising around half of the total population. Approximately 44% of the internally displaced population (IDP) consists of individuals who are below the legal age of majority, indicating that a significant majority of IDPs are considered youthful adults. Ezebuilo, (2023) has submitted the great importance of youth development as part of prevention and management of conflict in the

society. As part of the consequences, NEMA reports that the insurgency has resulted in significant displacement, with approximately 94% of the population being forced to abandon their residences. According to some scholars (Sadat et al., 2021), the reopening of Maiduguri, the state capital, was primarily focused on determining the future of other local government areas (Okolo et al., 2015). This decision was made after several displaced individuals had already been resettled in different parts of Nigeria. In addition, various IDPs were set up in a remote local government area, specifically 22 out of 27, for a minimum duration of two years. Also, the management of IDPs in the North-eastern five local governments of the nation has been responsible for determining the criteria for good and bad leadership and governance for a period. The north-eastern region of Nigeria has experienced significant devastation, impacting both the stakeholders of governance determinism and the region's economic growth, primarily due to the insurgency. Moreover, Abbani (2021) in the viewpoint attests that the collapse of local government and administration resulted in population displacement, an increase in the prevalence of disabilities, and the violation of human rights among residents in the north-east region. The study shows that the occurrence of these wars led to a rise in attacks and an upsurge in government tasks in managing the IDP crisis in the study area.

Based on the data, it can be argued that the Boko Haram insurgency has had a detrimental impact on the security situation in Nigeria (Brechenmacher, 2019). The consequences have arisen due to the extensive devastation of both private and public assets, the disruption of socio-economic endeavours, loss of life and displacement of individuals, and the pursuit of transforming the nation into an Islamic caliphate, consequently jeopardizing its unity, territorial integrity, and overall stability (Amalu, 2015). Of this development, peace and stability of the northern states of Nigeria were significantly compromised by Boko Haram's combat tactics, notably their deployment of suicide bombers. Chukwudi, Gberevbie, Abasilim, and Imhonopi (2019) and Chukwudi, Idowu, & Gberevbie, (2022) submitted that it is the responsibility of a country to maintain the stability of its environment. Awortu (2015) argues that it is important to note that the impact of suicide bomb attacks by the group extended beyond the northern region, generating a tangible sense of fear and apprehension throughout the entire country. The heightened security consciousness and rigorous security protocols in financial and tertiary institutions, as well as social gatherings like wedding ceremonies, in various regions of the nation, can be attributed to the apprehension surrounding Boko Haram suicide bombers. Because of concerns regarding the potential for armed assaults and the potential utilisation of suicide bombers by Boko Haram, the University of Ibadan's administration, situated in the south-west region of the country, implemented rigorous security protocols at the entrances of the

university on September 14, 2011 (Granville, 2020). These measures involved subjecting students, staff, and visitors to comprehensive physical inspections, as well as the utilisation of metal and bomb detection devices according to this study.

In a similar vein, the group's armed assaults, primarily concentrated in the northeastern region, predominantly targeted educational establishments due to their explicit disavowal of Western education and scientific knowledge. The primary objective of the attacks was to dissuade individuals from pursuing a Western-style education (Emmanuelar, 2015). The incident highlighted the occurrence of a forceful assault on the Government Secondary School in Chibok, located in the state of Borno. This resulted in the abduction of more than two hundred female students in April 2014, as well as multiple instances of firearm assaults and bombings targeting educational institutions. The incidents encompass instances of armed assaults on the Federal College of Education, Kano, which occurred on September 17, 2014. These attacks resulted in the unfortunate loss of 15 students' lives and left 34 individuals with various degrees of injuries (Adeyemi & Alabelewe, 2014). Furthermore, as a component of the strategy aimed at impeding educational processes and dissuading individuals from pursuing Western education, school authorities were frequently targeted with written notifications of armed assaults on educational institutions. Government College and Mount Saint Gabriel Secondary School, located in Makurdi, Benue State in the north-central region of the country, were both recipients of threat letters from the group on May 14, 2014, indicating an imminent armed assault (Soriwei & Adepegba, 2014).

Despite the absence of actual attacks, it is noteworthy that the group had previously issued comparable threats to media organizations, such as *This Day* newspaper in January 2012. Subsequently, these threats materialized into bombings at their offices in Abuja and Kaduna in May 2012 (Felix, 2012). As part of avoidance and limiting the level of attacks on media, Apeloko, Chukwudi, & Adekunle, (2023) have emphasized professionalism in media sector as it will help in conflict management. This serves to emphasize the gravity of the threats posed to educational institutions. The withdrawal of students from schools and the subsequent near collapse of the school system in the northeastern states can be attributed to the cumulative impact of Boko Haram's opposition to Western education, as reported by IRIN in 2013. The assertion made by Akinloye (2014) is supported by a report from the United Nations Children's Fund in 2014, which revealed that a minimum of 15,000 students residing in northern Nigeria ceased their attendance at educational institutions from February to April 2014. The significance of the figure lies in the context that the northern region, particularly the northeast, has historically been characterized by lower levels of educational development

compared to other regions in Nigeria.

In addition, the Boko Haram insurgency has had a significant impact on the ethnoreligious dynamics in Nigeria. This phenomenon occurred in two distinct manners. The first factor pertains to the palpable tension that existed between Christians and Muslims in the northern region and other areas of the country. During this period, there was a rise in attacks targeting Christians and Christian institutions, including churches, perpetrated by the group. Instances of potential reprisals, and in certain instances, confirmed acts of reprisal, were reported, involving Christians targeting Muslims residing in the northern regions. One instance that can be cited is the occurrence of religious violence in June 2012, specifically in Plateau State and southern Kaduna, located within Kaduna State. This violence stemmed from the attacks carried out by Boko Haram on churches, leading to clashes between individuals identifying as Christians and Muslims (Adi, 2012a; Adi, 2012). This shift in trend, however, occurred as it became evident that Boko Haram's actions were contrary to Islamic principles. This was primarily due to the group's escalating acts of violence against Muslims and their disregard for Islamic customs and establishments, such as mosques. Aluko, Apeloko, Chukwudi, & Paimo, (2023) maintained that the application of sanctions is necessary in the handling of the perpetrators of violent and evil activities. One additional factor to consider is the impact of Boko Haram's violent activities in the northern region on interethnic dynamics, particularly in terms of north-south relations. This phenomenon became apparent through the appeals made by leaders and intellectuals from the southern community, urging individuals of southern ethnic backgrounds residing in the northern regions to consider relocating back to their respective southern regions. Several community leaders from the southern region were identified as having initiated the actions.

In underpinning with a theory, after thorough research on conflict management theories and approaches, it has been found that modern conflict management theory is the most appropriate. The modern theory of conflict management incorporates past theories from Thomas, Blake, and Mouton; Renwick, Rahim, and Hall's models and theories in the 1960s and 1970s and combined them to create the modern conflict management theory. These theorists assert that conflict management is the application of strategies to resolve incompatible objectives in a positive manner (Wallensteen, 2018).

Effective conflict resolution, according to conflict management theory, requires open communication and a readiness to understand the interests and points of view of the other side (Ronquillo; Ellis; Toney-Butler, 2023). With good communication, all the negative issues of displacement and killings as experienced in Borno and Yobe could be avoidable.

## 4. DISCUSSION

### 4.1 Tragedy of management control and effect of regional sect belief

These individuals include Gani Adams, who serves as the leader of the Oodua People's Congress (OPC), a militant Yoruba ethnic militia based in the southwest. Additionally, Orji Uzor Kalu, the former governor of Abia state in the southeast, and Ralph Uwazuirike, the leader of MASSOB, an Igbo ethnic militia operating in the southeast, were also involved (Johnson, 2012). The phone conversations were based on the severity of Boko Haram's actions and the group's issuance of a three-day ultimatum to the southern population to leave the northern region of the country on January 2, 2012 (Johnson, 2012). Despite the absence of empirical evidence supporting the effectiveness of these appeals, the persistent acts of violence perpetrated by Boko Haram, coupled with the government's failure to effectively address the situation, prompted certain individuals from the southern regions to relocate from the northern areas (Nmeribeh, 2013). Additionally, the Boko Haram insurgency played a role in exacerbating political tensions throughout the 2015 general elections. The reason for the postponement of the elections, originally scheduled for February 14, 2015, was attributed to the presence of an insurgency. The purpose of this postponement was to provide the military with sufficient time to restore stability to the northeast region (Suleiman, 2015; The Guardian, 2015).

### 4.2 Implications of Boko Haram and Citizens' Displacement

The peace process has been halted due to the insurgency, leading to an increase in violence and tension in the region. This situation has significant implications for regional security (Kwangha and Robert, 2011). The increase in terrorism presents significant risks to Nigeria's emerging democracy and economic progress (Isayaku, 2013). The Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria has contributed to a rise in political violence, highlighting the lack of legitimacy of the government. This is exemplified by the failure of former President Jonathan to secure victory in the last election. According to a study conducted by William et al. in 2012, there is evidence to suggest that terrorism has an impact on behaviours and access to life satisfaction on a global scale. The occurrence of a terrorist event has the potential to generate a rallying effect among political parties, as observed in Nigeria, especially in the Fourth Republic. This could result in increased unity across party lines in opposition to the demands of the insurgents. The recent general elections conducted in three states (Adamawa, Yobe, and Borno) in the Northeastern parts of Nigeria were perceived as a threat to the electorates due to the presence of insurgency. This situation had negative consequences such as disenfranchisement and human rights abuses for the citizens of the country.

The rise of terrorism in Nigeria has led to increased conflicts in domestic politics and exacerbated ethno-regional problems. The Nigerian government recently deported approximately 7,000 illegal immigrants from neighbouring Chad and Niger Republic, which has had implications for foreign relations. This action was influenced by the level of insecurity experienced within the Nigerian State. The impact of these events extends beyond the relationship between those countries and Nigeria, as they also contribute to increased suspicion among them. Additionally, it was reported on November 25, 2014, that the Cameroonian government was compelled to close approximately 130 schools in the northern regions of the country due to the Boko Haram insurgency affecting neighbouring areas.

The increase in Boko Haram insurgency significantly affects the national political system. The upsurge refers to the factors that play a crucial role in determining the strength or failure of nation-states, as well as the erosion of state capacity both internally and externally (Abakpa and Tyokosu, 2022). Also, Boko Haram has emerged as a significant factor contributing to the weakening and potential failure of states in various regions, including Somalia, Afghanistan, Yemen, and Nigeria. Terrorist activities have been observed in numerous countries across the globe. By extension, the group possesses the ability to target any region to disrupt internal political stability and advance its agenda. The interference of terrorists in a country's sovereignty has a detrimental impact on the prospects of achieving eventual peace. It significantly hampers, if not completely obstructs, the efforts made towards establishing peace within the country. Terrorist acts have significant consequences, including the erosion of civil liberties within a nation and the undermining of sovereignty in international relations between states. According to Abakpa and Tyokosu (2022), these factors have had a significant impact on their relationships with other countries globally. Consequently, the study shows that the increase in terrorism in Nigeria and other countries with terrorist activities has had a significant impact on their bilateral and multilateral collaborations.

By the same token, UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, has called on the Nigerian government to act in response to the widespread loss of life and destruction caused by the Boko Haram terrorist attacks. There is a possibility that the United Nations may consider suspending all international travel to Nigeria in response to the ongoing insurgencies. The closure of American and British consulates in Nigeria, prompted by the potential threat of an attack, carries significant international implications. This situation puts multinational corporations and foreign subsidiaries operating in Nigeria at risk, potentially leading to their withdrawal from the country due to the threat of terrorism (Ogundiya and Amzat, 2008). The US government has recently released a list of 27 countries whose citizens are required to provide

fingerprints and photographs as part of the entry process into America. The negative impacts of this situation on the states' relations with the West should be considered.

### **4.3 Northeast reconstruction, displaced persons rehabilitation and Governance**

The Boko Haram insurgency has resulted in a significant displacement of people in the affected states (Osezua Ehiane and Sesa, 2021). Based on the available data, it appears that the magnitude of internally displaced persons and refugees linked to the insurgency has been significant. According to a report from the United Nations Humanitarian Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), the Northeast region of Nigeria has experienced significant displacement of at least 50,000 individuals due to the ongoing insurgency (Abubakar and Lawa, 2020). This information is supported by sources such as Adebowale (2013) and the International Crisis Group report (2013). According to the UNHCR, approximately 10,000 Nigerians have recently migrated to Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. According to local authorities, approximately 8,100 individuals have sought refuge in Cameroon (Cernea, 2004). They report that there is a continuous influx of Nigerians seeking refuge in the country. According to a report by the International Crisis Group in 2013, there are 2,700 Nigerian refugees in Niger and 150 in Chad. This is primarily focused on the impact of being separated from their family and social support networks. According to recent data from the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), a total of 16,470 individuals in Nigeria have been displaced. The primary causes of displacement are conflicts, ethno-religious crises, and the emergence of terrorism (Alkassim, 2013).

The increasing Boko Haram Insurgency in Northern Nigeria has significantly contributed to the growing number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the country. In terms of poverty, it is evident that the unemployment rate is significantly high (Sulaiman, 2019). This has led to a concerning trend of rural-urban migration, which could potentially result in the country being classified as a third-world nation (Dowd, 2016), as one of the contributing factors to this situation is the size of households. It is observed that single-member households have a poverty incidence of 12.6%, while households with 2-4 members have a poverty incidence of 39.3% (Tajudeen and Adebayo, 2013). The highest poverty incidence, at 57.9%, is found in households with 5-9 members (Afolabi, 2016). The data shows that households with 10-20 members have a 75% rate, while households with 20 members have a 90.7% rate (Jegade, 2019). Even though quality education is a crucial factor in liberating the population from conditions of squalor, ignorance, and poverty (Agbibo, 2013). According to a report by The Economist in 2014, there is a significant issue with children being out of school, with a staggering 9 million children affected (Ottuh and Omosor, 2022). It

is worth noting that most of these children come from the northern region of the country (Salleh et al., 2018). This suggests that there was a rise in poverty, unemployment, and insecurity as a result (Kamta et al., 2020). According to the data provided, households headed by individuals without any education had a poverty rate of 68.7%. Similarly, households headed by individuals without primary education had a poverty rate of 48.7% (Raji et al., 2021). On the other hand, households headed by individuals without secondary education had a poverty rate of 44.3%, while those headed by individuals without post-secondary education had a poverty rate of 26% (Nnadi et al., 2020). Thus, these factors have adverse effects on the economy.

The occupation of forestry and agriculture is prominent in the northeast, of Nigeria, with 75% of the total population engaged in farming. However, it is concerning that 50% of the population is experiencing food insecurity, indicating a significant number of individuals are going to bed hungry (Olawaju et al., 2018). Additionally, the poverty level stands at 67%, highlighting the high prevalence of poverty within the community (Sadat et al., 2021). According to several studies by Letswa and Isyaku (2018); and Mohammed (2020), rural areas have a poverty rate exceeding 65% because of insurgency. The country possesses abundant human, agricultural, petroleum, gas, and untapped solid mineral resources. However, the issue of leadership has been a significant challenge since gaining independence. The presence of the Boko Haram militant group in the region and their collaboration with local politicians has resulted in increased tension and violence, as they work towards their objectives (Izah, 2014). In Nigeria, it is widely recognised that the Boko Haram insurgency poses a significant security threat to the state. This has resulted in a crisis of leadership legitimacy, as the government is perceived as illegitimate due to its inability to effectively address the insurgency. Consequently, many citizens view the state as a failed entity.

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## **5. CONCLUSION**

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This study delves into the causes of the Nigerian insurgency, examining the profound impact of terrorism on children who have been displaced within the country. It also explores the current situation of the terrorists who are held captive and proposes potential strategies to prevent their future actions. In this direction, conflict management theory emphasises good communication between stakeholders to ensure stability. In addition, extensive theoretical research was conducted to explore the correlation between the religion of Boko Haram and management or control concepts and the fundamental factors contributing to the displacement of individuals within their own country (IDPs), as well as the underlying motivations behind acts of terrorism carried out by both groups and individuals. The inclusion of children's rights



and the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa enhances the overall framework. Other subtopics to explore are the Boko Haram insurgency, the situation of children living in IDP camps, and the assessment of the challenges faced by IDPs carried out by the International Humanitarian Agency, which includes visual representations of malnourished people. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has released comprehensive data on the global population of internally displaced persons (IDPs) because of armed conflicts and natural disasters.

When contemplating the future goals of the displaced children, it becomes evident that education is crucial in accelerating and enhancing their progress beyond their current challenging and impoverished circumstances. It could potentially aid them in processing the traumatic experiences they have endured, such as the harrowing acts of terrorism perpetrated by Boko Haram militants during their assault on their loved ones. The provision of sufficient education is crucial for ensuring the long-term sustainability of Nigeria's development. Corruption and inadequate education have a detrimental impact on both the existing IDP camps and the establishment of new ones. The suffering experienced by people and individuals at different stages of life can be attributed to the corruption in the administration and oversight of internally displaced persons. There have been concerns raised about the effectiveness of the humanitarian assistance provided by local authorities at various levels, despite the UNHCR being officially designated with the task of aiding internally displaced persons (IDPs). To ensure that internally displaced persons (IDPs) can maintain a satisfactory quality of life, it is suggested that the government's practice of identifying officials who hinder IDP service provision through whistleblowers should also extend to IDP camps and their responsible administration, allowing them to fulfill their duties.

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